Biblio
With the rapid progress of informatization construction in power business, data resource has become the basic strategic resource of the power industry and innovative element in power production. The security protection of data in power business is particularly important in the informatization construction of power business. In order to implement data security protection, transparent encryption is one of the fifteen key technical standards in the Construction Guideline of the Standard Network Data Security System. However, data storage in the encrypted state is bound to affect the security audit of data to a certain extent. Based on this problem, this paper proposes a scheme to audit the sensitivity of the power business data under the protection of encryption to achieve an efficient sensitivity audit of ciphertext data with the premise of not revealing the decryption key or data information. Through a security demonstration, this paper fully proves that this solution is secure under the known plaintext attacks.
In this paper, we present the enhancement of a lightweight key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) scheme designed for the Internet of Things (IoT). The KP-ABE scheme was claimed to achieve ciphertext indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack in the selective-set model but we show that the KP-ABE scheme is insecure even in the weaker security notion, namely, one-way encryption under the same attack and model. In particular, we show that an attacker can decrypt a ciphertext which does not satisfy the policy imposed on his decryption key. Subsequently, we propose an efficient fix to the KP-ABE scheme as well as extending it to be a hierarchical KP-ABE (H-KP-ABE) scheme that can support role delegation in IoT applications. An example of applying our H-KP-ABE on an IoT-connected healthcare system is given to highlight the benefit of the delegation feature. Lastly, using the NIST curves secp192k1 and secp256k1, we benchmark the fixed (hierarchical) KP-ABE scheme on an Android phone and the result shows that the scheme is still the fastest in the literature.
Quantum low probability of intercept transmits ciphertext in a way that prevents an eavesdropper possessing the decryption key from recovering the plaintext. It is capable of Gbps communication rates on optical fiber over metropolitan-area distances.
Privacy preservation is very essential in various real life applications such as medical science and financial analysis. This paper focuses on implementation of an asymmetric secure multi-party computation protocol using anonymization and public-key encryption where all parties have access to trusted third party (TTP) who (1) doesn't add any contribution to computation (2) doesn't know who is the owner of the input received (3) has large number of resources (4) decryption key is known to trusted third party (TTP) to get the actual input for computation of final result. In this environment, concern is to design a protocol which deploys TTP for computation. It is proposed that the protocol is very proficient (in terms of secure computation and individual privacy) for the parties than the other available protocols. The solution incorporates protocol using asymmetric encryption scheme where any party can encrypt a message with the public key but decryption can be done by only the possessor of the decryption key (private key). As the protocol works on asymmetric encryption and packetization it ensures following: (1) Confidentiality (Anonymity) (2) Security (3) Privacy (Data).
ID/password-based authentication is commonly used in network services. Some users set different ID/password pairs for different services, but other users reuse a pair of ID/password to other services. Such recycling allows the list attack in which an adversary tries to spoof a target user by using a list of IDs and passwords obtained from other system by some means (an insider attack, malwares, or even a DB leakage). As a countermeasure agains the list attack, biometric authentication attracts much attention than before. In 2012, Hattori et al. proposed a cancelable biometrics authentication scheme (fundamental scheme) based on homomorphic encryption algorithms. In the scheme, registered biometric information (template) and biometric information to compare are encrypted, and the similarity between these biometric information is computed with keeping encrypted. Only the privileged entity (a decryption center), who has a corresponding decryption key, can obtain the similarity by decrypting the encrypted similarity and judge whether they are same or not. Then, Hirano et al. showed the replay attack against this scheme, and, proposed two enhanced authentication schemes. In this paper, we propose a spoofing attack against the fundamental scheme when the feature vector, which is obtained by digitalizing the analogue biometric information, is represented as a binary coding such as Iris Code and Competitive Code. The proposed attack uses an unexpected vector as input, whose distance to all possible binary vectors is constant. Since the proposed attack is independent from the replay attack, the attack is also applicable to two revised schemes by Hirano et al. as well. Moreover, this paper also discusses possible countermeasures to the proposed spoofing attack. In fact, this paper proposes a countermeasure by detecting such unexpected vector.