Biblio

In recent years, integrated circuits (ICs) have become significant for various industries and their security has been given greater priority, specifically in the supply chain. Budgetary constraints have compelled IC designers to offshore manufacturing to third-party companies. When the designer gets the manufactured ICs back, it is imperative to test for potential threats like hardware trojans (HT). In this paper, a novel multi-level game-theoretic framework is introduced to analyze the interactions between a malicious IC manufacturer and the tester. In particular, the game is formulated as a non-cooperative, zero-sum, repeated game using prospect theory (PT) that captures different players' rationalities under uncertainty. The repeated game is separated into a learning stage, in which the defender learns about the attacker's tendencies, and an actual game stage, where this learning is used. Experiments show great incentive for the attacker to deceive the defender about their actual rationality by "playing dumb" in the learning stage (deception). This scenario is captured using hypergame theory to model the attacker's view of the game. The optimal deception rationality of the attacker is analytically derived to maximize utility gain. For the defender, a first-step deception mitigation process is proposed to thwart the effects of deception. Simulation results show that the attacker can profit from the deception as it can successfully insert HTs in the manufactured ICs without being detected.

Hypergame theory has been used to model advantages in decision making. This research provides a formal representation of deception to further extend the hypergame model. In order to extend the model, we propose a hypergame theoretic framework based on temporal logic to model decision making under the potential for trust and deception. Using the temporal hypergame model, the concept of trust is defined within the constraints of the model. With a formal definition of trust in hypergame theory, the concepts of distrust, mistrust, misperception, and deception are then constructed. These formal definitions are then applied to an Attacker-Defender hypergame to show how the deception within the game can be formally modeled; the model is presented. This demonstrates how hypergame theory can be used to model trust, mistrust, misperception, and deception using a formal model.