Biblio

Recent years have seen an increase in the data usage in cars, particularly as they become more autonomous and connected. With the rise in data use have come concerns about automotive cyber-security. An in-vehicle network shown to be particularly vulnerable is the Controller Area Network (CAN), which is the communication bus used by the car's safety critical and performance critical components. Cyber attacks on the CAN have been demonstrated, leading to research to develop attack detection and attack prevention systems. Such research requires representative attack demonstrations and data for testing. Obtaining this data is problematical due to the expense, danger and impracticality of using real cars on roads or tracks for example attacks. Whilst CAN simulators are available, these tend to be configured for testing conformance and functionality, rather than analysing security and cyber vulnerability. We therefore adapt a leading, industry-standard, CAN simulator to incorporate a core set of cyber attacks that are representative of those proposed by other researchers. Our adaptation allows the user to configure the attacks, and can be added easily to the free version of the simulator. Here we describe the simulator and, after reviewing the attacks that have been demonstrated and discussing their commonalities, we outline the attacks that we have incorporated into the simulator.

This scientific paper reveals an intelligent system for data acquisition for dam monitoring and diagnose. This system is built around the RS485 communication standard and uses its own communication protocol [2]. The aim of the system is to monitor all signal levels inside the communication bus, respectively to detect the out of action data loggers. The diagnose test extracts the following functional parameters: supply voltage and the absolute value and common mode value for differential signals used in data transmission (denoted with “A” and “B”). Analyzing this acquired information, it's possible to find short-circuits or open-circuits across the communication bus. The measurement and signal processing functions, for flaws, are implemented inside the system's central processing unit. The next testing step is finding the out of action data loggers and is being made by trying to communicate with every data logger inside the network. The lack of any response from a data logger is interpreted as an error and using the code of the data logger's microcontroller, it is possible to find its exact position inside the dam infrastructure. The novelty of this procedure is the fact that it completely automates the diagnose procedure, which, until now, was made visually by checking every data logger.