Biblio

We showcase the capabilities of V2Verifier, a new open-source software-defined radio (SDR) testbed for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications security, to expose the strengths and vulnerabilities of current V2V security systems based on the IEEE 1609.2 standard. V2Verifier supports both major V2V technologies and facilitates a broad range of experimentation with upper- and lower-layer attacks using a combination of SDRs and commercial V2V on-board units (OBUs). We demonstrate two separate attacks (jamming and replay) against Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) and Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X) technologies, experimentally quantifying the threat posed by these types of attacks. We also use V2Verifier's open-source implementation to show how the 1609.2 standard can effectively mitigate certain types of attacks (e.g., message replay), facilitating further research into the security of V2V.

Modern vehicles are equipped with wireless communication technologies, allowing them to communicate with each other. Through Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC), vehicles periodically broadcast beacons messages for safety applications, which gives rise to disclosure of location privacy. A way to protect vehicles location privacy is to have their pseudonyms changed frequently. With restrict to limited resources (such as computation and storage), we propose a group based dynamic mix zone scheme, in which vehicles form a group when their pseudonyms are close to expire. Simulation results confirm that the proposed scheme can protect location privacy and alleviate the storage burden.