Biblio

The proliferation of connected devices has motivated a surge in the development of cryptographic protocols to support a diversity of devices and use cases. To address this trend, we propose continuous verification, a methodology for secure cryptographic protocol design that consists of three principles: (1) repeated use of verification tools; (2) judicious use of common message components; and (3) inclusion of verifiable model specifications in standards. Our recommendations are derived from previous work in the formal methods community, as well as from our past experiences applying verification tools to improve standards. Through a case study of IETF protocols for the IoT, we illustrate the power of continuous verification by (i) discovering flaws in the protocols using the Cryptographic Protocol Shapes Analyzer (CPSA); (ii) identifying the corresponding fixes based on the feedback provided by CPSA; and (iii) demonstrating that verifiable models can be intuitive, concise and suitable for inclusion in standards to enable third-party verification and future modifications.

Security protocols are critical components for the construction of secure and dependable distributed applications, but their implementation is challenging and error prone. Therefore, tools for formal modelling and analysis of security protocols can be potentially very useful to support software engineers. However, despite such tools have been available for a long time, their adoption outside the research community has been very limited. In fact, most practitioners find such applications too complex and hardly usable for their daily work. In this paper, we present an Integrated Development Environment for the design, verification and implementation of security protocols, aimed at lowering the adoption barrier of formal methods tools for security. In the spirit of Model Driven Development, the environment supports the user in the specification of the model using the simple and intuitive language AnB (and its extension AnBx). Moreover, it provides a push-button solution for the formal verification of the abstract and concrete models, and for the automatic generation of Java implementation. This Eclipse-based IDE leverages on existing languages and tools for modelling and verification of security protocols, such as the AnBx Compiler and Code Generator, the model checker OFMC and the protocol verifier ProVerif.

Performance analysis of newly designed solutions is essential for efficient Internet of Things and Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) deployments. Simulation and experimental evaluation practices are vital steps for the development process of protocols and applications for wireless technologies. Nowadays, the new solutions can be tested at a very large scale over both simulators and testbeds. In this paper, we first discuss the importance of repeatable experimental setups for reproducible performance evaluation results. To this aim, we present FIT IoT-LAB, a very large-scale and experimental testbed, i.e., consists of 2769 low-power wireless devices and 127 mobile robots. We then demonstrate through a number of experiments conducted on FIT IoT-LAB testbed, how to conduct meaningful experiments under real-world conditions. Finally, we discuss to what extent results obtained from experiments could be considered as scientific, i.e., reproducible by the community.

Security of Constrained application protocol(COAP) used instead of HTTP in Internet of Thing s(IoT) is achieved using DTLS which uses the Internet key exchange protocol for key exchange and management. In this work a novel key exchange and authentication protocol is proposed. CLIKEv2 protcol is a certificate less and light weight version of the existing protocol. The protocol design is tested with the formal protcol verification tool Scyther, where no named attacks are identified for the propsed protocol. Compared to the existing IKE protocol the CLIKEv2 protocol reduces the computation time, key sizes and ultimately reduces energy consumption.

Induction is a successful approach for verification of hardware and software systems. A common practice is to model a system using logical formulas, and then use a decision procedure to verify that some logical formula is an inductive safety invariant for the system. A key ingredient in this approach is coming up with the inductive invariant, which is known as invariant inference. This is a major difficulty, and it is often left for humans or addressed by sound but incomplete abstract interpretation. This paper is motivated by the problem of inductive invariants in shape analysis and in distributed protocols. This paper approaches the general problem of inferring first-order inductive invariants by restricting the language L of candidate invariants. Notice that the problem of invariant inference in a restricted language L differs from the safety problem, since a system may be safe and still not have any inductive invariant in L that proves safety. Clearly, if L is finite (and if testing an inductive invariant is decidable), then inferring invariants in L is decidable. This paper presents some interesting cases when inferring inductive invariants in L is decidable even when L is an infinite language of universal formulas. Decidability is obtained by restricting L and defining a suitable well-quasi-order on the state space. We also present some undecidability results that show that our restrictions are necessary. We further present a framework for systematically constructing infinite languages while keeping the invariant inference problem decidable. We illustrate our approach by showing the decidability of inferring invariants for programs manipulating linked-lists, and for distributed protocols.

Sego is a hypervisor-based system that gives strong privacy and integrity guarantees to trusted applications, even when the guest operating system is compromised or hostile. Sego verifies operating system services, like the file system, instead of replacing them. By associating trusted metadata with user data across all system devices, Sego verifies system services more efficiently than previous systems, especially services that depend on data contents. We extensively evaluate Sego's performance on real workloads and implement a kernel fault injector to validate Sego's file system-agnostic crash consistency and recovery protocol.

Parallel and distributed systems rely on intricate protocols to manage shared resources and synchronize, i.e., to manage how many processes are in a particular state. Effective verification of such systems requires universally quantification to reason about parameterized state and cardinalities tracking sets of processes, messages, failures to adequately capture protocol logic. In this paper we present Tool, an automatic invariant synthesis method that integrates cardinality-based reasoning and universal quantification. The resulting increase of expressiveness allows Tool to verify, for the first time, a representative collection of intricate parameterized protocols.

Cryptographic protocols and algorithms are the strength of digital era in which we are living. Unluckily, the security of many confidential information and credentials has been compromised due to ignorance of required security services. As a result, various attacks have been introduced by talented attackers and many security issues like as financial loss, violations of personal privacy, and security threats to democracy. This research paper provides the secure design and architecture of cryptographic protocols and expedites the authentication of cryptographic system. Designing and developing a secure cryptographic system is like a game in which designer or developer tries to maintain the security while attacker tries to penetrate the security features to perform successful attack.

Yamata-no-Orochi is an authentication and authorization infrastructure across multiple service domains and provides Internet services with unified authentication and authorization mechanisms. In this paper, Yamata-no-Orochi is incorporated into a video distribution system to verify its general versatility as a multi-domain authentication and authorization infrastructure for Internet services. This paper also reduces the authorization time of Yamata-no-Orochi to fulfill the processing time constrains of the video distribution system. The evaluation results show that all the authentication and authorization processes work correctly and the performance of Yamata-no-Orochi is practical for the video distribution system.

We present the first formal verification of state machine safety for the Raft consensus protocol, a critical component of many distributed systems. We connected our proof to previous work to establish an end-to-end guarantee that our implementation provides linearizable state machine replication. This proof required iteratively discovering and proving 90 system invariants. Our verified implementation is extracted to OCaml and runs on real networks. The primary challenge we faced during the verification process was proof maintenance, since proving one invariant often required strengthening and updating other parts of our proof. To address this challenge, we propose a methodology of planning for change during verification. Our methodology adapts classical information hiding techniques to the context of proof assistants, factors out common invariant-strengthening patterns into custom induction principles, proves higher-order lemmas that show any property proved about a particular component implies analogous properties about related components, and makes proofs robust to change using structural tactics. We also discuss how our methodology may be applied to systems verification more broadly.

In infrastructure wireless network technology, communication between users is provided within a certain area supported by access points (APs) or base station communication networks, but in ad-hoc networks, communication between users is provided only through direct connections between nodes. Ad-hoc network technology supports mobility directly through routing algorithms. However, when a connected node is lost owing to the node's movement, the routing protocol transfers this traffic to another node. The routing table in the node that is receiving the traffic detects any changes that occur and manages them. This paper proposes a routing protocol method that sets up multi-hops in the ad-hoc network and verifies the performance, which provides more effective connection persistence than existing methods.

The HTTPS ecosystem, including the SSL/TLS protocol, the X.509 public-key infrastructure, and their cryptographic libraries, is the standardized foundation of Internet Security. Despite 20 years of progress and extensions, however, its practical security remains controversial, as witnessed by recent efforts to improve its design and implementations, as well as recent disclosures of attacks against its deployments. The Everest project is a collaboration between Microsoft Research, INRIA, and the community at large that aims at modelling, programming, and verifying the main HTTPS components with strong machine-checked security guarantees, down to core system and cryptographic assumptions. Although HTTPS involves a relatively small amount of code, it requires efficient low-level programming and intricate proofs of functional correctness and security. To this end, we are also improving our verifications tools (F*, Dafny, Lean, Z3) and developing new ones. In my talk, I will present our project, review our experience with miTLS, a verified reference implementation of TLS coded in F*, and describe current work towards verified, secure, efficient HTTPS.

This work is motivated by the rapid increase of the number of attacks in computer networks and software engineering. In this paper we study identity snowball attacks and formally prove the correctness of suggested solutions to this type of attack (solutions that are based on the graph reachability reduction) using a proof assistant. We propose a model of an attack graph that captures technical informations about the calculation of reachability of the graph. The model has been implemented with the proof assistant PVS 6.0 (Prototype Verification System). It makes it possible to prove algorithms of reachability reduction such as Sparsest\_cut.

The Maude-NRL Protocol Analyzer (Maude-NPA) is a tool for reasoning about the security of cryptographic protocols in which the cryptosystems satisfy different equational properties. It tries to find secrecy or authentication attacks by searching backwards from an insecure attack state pattern that may contain logical variables, in such a way that logical variables become properly instantiated in order to find an initial state. The execution mechanism for this logical reachability is narrowing modulo an equational theory. Although Maude-NPA also possesses a forwards semantics naturally derivable from the backwards semantics, it is not suitable for state space exploration or protocol simulation. In this paper we define an executable forwards semantics for Maude-NPA, instead of its usual backwards one, and restrict it to the case of concrete states, that is, to terms without logical variables. This case corresponds to standard rewriting modulo an equational theory. We prove soundness and completeness of the backwards narrowing-based semantics with respect to the rewriting-based forwards semantics. We show its effectiveness as an analysis method that complements the backwards analysis with new prototyping, simulation, and explicit-state model checking features by providing some experimental results.