Biblio

We study the problem of designing a dynamic mechanism for security management in an interconnected multi-agent system with N strategic agents and one coordinator. The system is modeled as a network of N vertices. Each agent resides in one of the vertices of the network and has a privately known security state that describes its safety level at each time. The evolution of an agent's security state depends on its own state, the states of its neighbors in the network and on actions taken by a network coordinator. Each agent's utility at time instant t depends on its own state, the states of its neighbors in the network and on actions taken by a network coordinator. The objective of the network coordinator is to take security actions in order to maximize the long-term expected social surplus. Since agents are strategic and their security states are private information, the coordinator needs to incentivize agents to reveal their information. This results in a dynamic mechanism design problem for the coordinator. We leverage the inter-temporal correlations between the agents' security states to identify sufficient conditions under which an incentive compatible expected social surplus maximizing mechanism can be constructed. We then identify two special cases of our formulation and describe how the desired mechanism is constructed in these cases.

Trusted collaboration satisfying the requirements of (a) adequate transparency and (b) preservation of privacy of business sensitive information is a key factor to ensure the success and adoption of online business-to-business (B2B) collaboration platforms. Our work proposes novel ways of stringing together game theoretic modeling, blockchain technology, and cryptographic techniques to build such a platform for B2B collaboration involving enterprise buyers and sellers who may be strategic. The B2B platform builds upon three ideas. The first is to use a permissioned blockchain with smart contracts as the technical infrastructure for building the platform. Second, the above smart contracts implement deep business logic which is derived using a rigorous analysis of a repeated game model of the strategic interactions between buyers and sellers to devise strategies to induce honest behavior from buyers and sellers. Third, we present a formal framework that captures the essential requirements for secure and private B2B collaboration, and, in this direction, we develop cryptographic regulation protocols that, in conjunction with the blockchain, help implement such a framework. We believe our work is an important first step in the direction of building a platform that enables B2B collaboration among strategic and competitive agents while maximizing social welfare and addressing the privacy concerns of the agents.