Biblio

Detecting software security vulnerabilities and distinguishing vulnerable from non-vulnerable code is anything but simple. Most of the time, vulnerabilities remain undisclosed until they are exposed, for instance, by an attack during the software operational phase. Software metrics are widely-used indicators of software quality, but the question is whether they can be used to distinguish vulnerable software units from the non-vulnerable ones during development. In this paper, we perform an exploratory study on software metrics, their interdependency, and their relation with security vulnerabilities. We aim at understanding: i) the correlation between software architectural characteristics, represented in the form of software metrics, and the number of vulnerabilities; and ii) which are the most informative and discriminative metrics that allow identifying vulnerable units of code. To achieve these goals, we use, respectively, correlation coefficients and heuristic search techniques. Our analysis is carried out on a dataset that includes software metrics and reported security vulnerabilities, exposed by security attacks, for all functions, classes, and files of five widely used projects. Results show: i) a strong correlation between several project-level metrics and the number of vulnerabilities, ii) the possibility of using a group of metrics, at both file and function levels, to distinguish vulnerable and non-vulnerable code with a high level of accuracy.

Wireless information security generates shared secret keys from reciprocal channel dynamics. Current solutions are mostly based on temporal per-frame channel measurements of signal strength and suffer from low key generate rate (KGR), large budget in channel probing, and poor secrecy if a channel does not temporally vary significantly. This paper designs a cross-layer solution that measures noise-free per-symbol channel dynamics across both time and frequency domain and derives keys from the highly fine-grained per-symbol reciprocal channel measurements. This solution consists of merits that: (1) the persymbol granularity improves the volume of available uncorrelated channel measurements by orders of magnitude over per-frame granularity in conventional solutions and so does KGR; 2) the solution exploits subtle channel fluctuations in frequency domain that does not force users to move to incur enough temporal variations as conventional solutions require; and (3) it measures noise-free channel response that suppresses key bit disagreement between trusted users. As a result, in every aspect, the proposed solution improves the security performance by orders of magnitude over conventional solutions. The performance has been evaluated on both a GNU SDR testbed in practice and a local GNU Radio simulator. The cross-layer solution can generate a KGR of 24.07 bits per probing frame on testbed or 19 bits in simulation, although conventional optimal solutions only has a KGR of at most one or two bit per probing frame. It also has a low key bit disagreement ratio while maintaining a high entropy rate. The derived keys show strong independence with correlation coefficients mostly less than 0.05. Furthermore, it is empirically shown that any slight physical change, e.g. a small rotation of antenna, results in fundamentally different cross-layer frequency measurements, which implies the strong secrecy and high efficiency of the proposed solution.