Biblio

Android applications (Apps) have penetrated almost every aspect of our lives, bring users great convenience as well as security concerns. Even though Android system adopts permission mechanism to restrict Apps from accessing important resources of a smartphone, such as telephony, camera and GPS location, users face still significant risk of privacy leakage due to the overprivileged permissions. The overprivileged permission means the extra permission declared by the App but has nothing to do with its function. Unfortunately, there doesn't exist any tool for ordinary users to detect the overprivileged permission of an App, hence most users grant any permission declared by the App, intensifying the risk of private information leakage. Although some previous studies tried to solve the problem of permission overprivilege, their methods are not applicable nowadays because of the progress of App protection technology and the update of Android system. Towards this end, we develop a user-friendly tool based on frequent item set mining for the detection of overprivileged permissions of Android Apps, which is named Droidtector. Droidtector can operate in online or offline mode and users can choose any mode according to their situation. Finally, we run Droidtector on 1000 Apps crawled from Google Play and find that 479 of them are overprivileged, accounting for about 48% of all the sample Apps.

Protecting modern computer systems and complex software stacks against the growing range of possible attacks is becoming increasingly difficult. The architecture of modern commodity systems allows attackers to subvert privileged system software often using a single exploit. Once the system is compromised, inclusive permissions used by current architectures and operating systems easily allow a compromised high-privileged software layer to perform arbitrary malicious activities, even on behalf of other software layers. This paper presents a hardware-supported page permission scheme for the physical pages that is based on the concept of non-inclusive sets of memory permissions for different layers of system software such as hypervisors, operating systems, and user-level applications. Instead of viewing privilege levels as an ordered hierarchy with each successive level being more privileged, we view them as distinct levels each with its own set of permissions. Such a permission mechanism, implemented as part of a processor architecture, provides a common framework for defending against a range of recent attacks. We demonstrate that such a protection can be achieved with negligible performance overhead, low hardware complexity and minimal changes to the commodity OS and hypervisor code.