Biblio

As cyber threats become highly damaging and complex, a new cybersecurity compliance certification model has been developed by the Department of Defense (DoD) to secure its Defense Industrial Base (DIB), and communication with its private partners. These partners or contractors are obligated by the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations (DFARS) to be compliant with the latest standards in computer and data security. The Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC), and it is built upon existing DFARS 252.204-7012 and the NIST SP 800–171 controls. As of 2020, the DoD has incorporated DFARS and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recommended security practices into what is now the CMMC. This paper presents the most commonly identified Security-Control-Deficiencies (SCD) faced, the attacks mitigated by addressing these SCD, and remediations applied to 127 DoD contractors in order to bring them into compliance with the CMMC guidelines. An analysis is done on what vulnerabilities are most prominent in the companies, and remediations applied to ensure these vulnerabilities are better avoided and the DoD supply-chain is more secure from attacks.

This work examines metrics that can be used to measure the ability of agile software development methods to meet security and privacy requirements of communications applications. Many implementations of communication protocols, including those in vehicular networks, occur within regulated environments where agile development methods are traditionally discouraged. We propose a framework and metrics to measure adherence to security, quality and software effectiveness regulations if developers desire the cost and schedule benefits of agile methods. After providing an overview of specific challenges that a regulated environment imposes on communications software development, we proceed to examine the 12 agile principles and how they relate to a regulatory environment. From this review we identify two metrics to measure performance of three key regulatory attributes of software for communications applications, and then recommend an approach of either tools, agile methods or DevOps that is best positioned to satisfy its regulated environment attributes. By considering the recommendations in this paper, managers of software-dominant communications programs in a regulated environment can gain insight into leveraging the benefits of agile methods.

This work examines metrics that can be used to measure the ability of agile software development methods to meet security and privacy requirements of communications applications. Many implementations of communication protocols, including those in vehicular networks, occur within regulated environments where agile development methods are traditionally discouraged. We propose a framework and metrics to measure adherence to security, quality and software effectiveness regulations if developers desire the cost and schedule benefits of agile methods. After providing an overview of specific challenges that a regulated environment imposes on communications software development, we proceed to examine the 12 agile principles and how they relate to a regulatory environment. From this review we identify two metrics to measure performance of three key regulatory attributes of software for communications applications, and then recommend an approach of either tools, agile methods or DevOps that is best positioned to satisfy its regulated environment attributes. By considering the recommendations in this paper, managers of software-dominant communications programs in a regulated environment can gain insight into leveraging the benefits of agile methods.

Despite the high performance of neural style transfer on stylized pictures, we found that Gatys et al [1] algorithm cannot perfectly reconstruct texture style. Output stylized picture could emerge unsatisfied unexpected textures such like muddiness in local area and insufficient grain expression. Our method bases on original algorithm, adding the Gradient Gram description on style loss, aiming to strengthen texture expression and eliminate muddiness. To some extent our method lengthens the runtime, however, its output stylized pictures get higher performance on texture details, especially in the elimination of muddiness.

The Department of Defense (DoD) manages capabilities through the Joint Interoperability and Capability Development System (JCIDS) process. As part of this process, sponsors develop a series of DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF) products to assist analysts understand the proposed capability and how it fits into the broader network of DoD legacy systems and systems under development. However, the Joint Staff, responsible for executing the JCIDS process, often analyzes these architectures in isolation without considering the broader network of systems. DoD leadership, the Government Accountability Organization, and others have noted the lack of the DoD's ability to manage the broader portfolio of capabilities in various reports and papers. Several efforts have proposed merging DoDAF architecture into a larger meta-architecture based on individual system architectures. This paper specifically targets the Systems View 3 (SV-3), System-to-system matrix, as an opportunity to merge multiple DoDAF architecture views into a network of system and understand the potential benefits associated with analyzing a broader perspective. The goal of merging multiple SV-3s is to better understand the interoperability of a system within the network of DoD systems as network metrics may provide insights into the relative interoperability of a DoD system. Currently, the DoD's definition of interoperability focuses on the system or capability's ability to enter and operate within the DoD Information Network (DoDIN); however, this view limits the definition of interoperability as it focuses solely on information flows and not resource flows or physical connections that should be present in a SV-3. The paper demonstrates the importance of including all forms of connections between systems in a network by comparing network metrics associated with the different types of connections. Without a complete set of DoDAF architectures for each system within the DoD and based on the potential classification of these products, the paper collates data that should be included in an SV-3 from open source, unclassified references to build the overall network of DoD systems. From these sources, a network of over 300 systems with almost 1000 connections emerges based on the documented information, resource, and physical connections between these legacy and planned DoD systems. With this network, the paper explores the quantification of individual system's interoperability through the application of nodal and network metrics from social network analysis (SNA). A SNA perspective on a network of systems provides additional insights beyond traditional network analysis because of the emphasis on the importance of nodes, systems, in the network as well as the relationship, connections, between the nodes. Finally, the paper proposes future work to explore the quantification of additional attributes of systems as well as a method for further validating the findings.

Federated authentication can drastically reduce the overhead of basic account maintenance while simultaneously improving overall system security. Integrating with the user's more frequently used account at their primary organization both provides a better experience to the end user and makes account compromise or changes in affiliation more likely to be noticed and acted upon. Additionally, with many organizations transitioning to multi-factor authentication for all account access, the ability to leverage external federated identity management systems provides the benefit of their efforts without the additional overhead of separately implementing a distinct multi-factor authentication process. This paper describes our experiences and the lessons we learned by enabling federated authentication with the U.S. Government PKI and In Common Federation, scaling it up to the user base of a production HPC system, and the motivations behind those choices. We have received only positive feedback from our users.

The advent of the cyber domain has introduced a new dimension into warfare and complicated existing strategic concepts, provoking divergent responses within different national contexts and strategic cultures. Although current theories regarding cyber deterrence remain relatively nascent, a comparison of U.S. and Chinese strategic thinking highlights notable asymmetries between their respective approaches. While U.S. debates on cyber deterrence have primarily focused on the deterrence of cyber threats, Chinese theorists have also emphasized the potential importance of cyber capabilities to enhance strategic deterrence. Whereas the U.S. government has maintained a consistent declaratory policy for response, Beijing has yet to progress toward transparency regarding its cyber strategy or capabilities. However, certain PLA strategists, informed by a conceptualization of deterrence as integrated with warfighting, have advocated for the actualization of deterrence through engaging in cyber attacks. Regardless of whether these major cyber powers' evolving strategic thinking on cyber deterrence will prove logically consistent or feasibly operational, their respective perspectives will certainly shape their attempts to achieve cyber deterrence. Ultimately, cyber deterrence may continue to be "what states make of it," given conditions of "cyber anarchy" and prevailing uncertainties regarding cyber conflict. Looking forward, future strategic stability in Sino-U.S. cyber interactions will require mitigation of the misperceptions and heightened risks of escalation that could be exacerbated by these divergent strategic approaches.

This paper describes a novel aerospace electronic component risk assessment methodology and supporting virtual laboratory structure designed to augment existing supply chain management practices and aid in Microelectronics Trust Assurance. This toolkit and methodology applies structure to the unclear and evolving risk assessment problem, allowing quantification of key risks affecting both advanced and obsolete systems that rely on semiconductor technologies. The impacts of logistics & supply chain risk, technology & counterfeit risk, and faulty component risk on trusted and non-trusted procurement options are quantified. The benefits of component testing on part reliability are assessed and incorporated into counterfeit mitigation calculations. This toolkit and methodology seek to assist acquisition staff by providing actionable decision data regarding the increasing threat of counterfeit components by assessing the risks faced by systems, identifying mitigation strategies to reduce this risk, and resolving these risks through the optimal test and procurement path based on the component criticality risk tolerance of the program.

In the 21st century, each country must make decisions on how to utilize modern technologies to maximize benefits and minimize repercussions. For example, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) needs to be able to share information efficiently with its allies while simultaneously preventing unwarranted access or attacks. These attacks pose a threat to the national security of the United States, but proper use of the cyberspace provides countless benefits. The aim of this paper is to explore Identity and Access Management (IdAM) technologies that the Department of Defense can use in joint operations with allies that will allow efficient information-sharing and enhance security. To this end, we have created a methodology and a model for evaluating Identity and Access Management technologies that the Department of Defense can use in joint operations with other nations, with a specific focus on Japan and Australia. To evaluate these systems, we employed an approach that incorporates Political, Operational, Economic and Technical (POET) factors. Governance protocols, technological solutions, and political factors were first thoroughly reviewed and then used to construct an evaluation model to formally assess Identity and Access Management alternatives. This model provides systematic guidance on how the Department of Defense can improve their use of Identity and Access Management systems in the future.

This paper describes multiple system security engineering techniques for assessing system security vulnerabilities and discusses the application of these techniques at different system maturity points. The proposed vulnerability assessment approach allows a systems engineer to identify and assess vulnerabilities early in the life cycle and to continually increase the fidelity of the vulnerability identification and assessment as the system matures.

The United States, including the Department of Defense, relies heavily on information systems and networking technologies to efficiently conduct a wide variety of missions across the globe. With the ever-increasing rate of cyber attacks, this dependency places the nation at risk of a loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its critical information resources; degrading its ability to complete the mission. In this paper, we introduce the operational data classes for establishing situational awareness in cyberspace. A system effectively using our key information components will be able to provide the nation's leadership timely and accurate information to gain an understanding of the operational cyber environment to enable strategic, operational, and tactical decision-making. In doing so, we present, define and provide examples of our key classes of operational data for cyber situational awareness and present a hypothetical case study demonstrating how they must be consolidated to provide a clear and relevant picture to a commander. In addition, current organizational and technical challenges are discussed, and areas for future research are addressed.
 

The National Cyber Range (NCR) is an innovative Department of Defense (DoD) resource originally established by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and now under the purview of the Test Resource Management Center (TRMC). It provides a unique environment for cyber security testing throughout the program development life cycle using unique methods to assess resiliency to advanced cyberspace security threats. This paper describes what a cyber security range is, how it might be employed, and the advantages a program manager (PM) can gain in applying the results of range events. Creating realism in a test environment isolated from the operational environment is a special challenge in cyberspace. Representing the scale and diversity of the complex DoD communications networks at a fidelity detailed enough to realistically portray current and anticipated attack strategies (e.g., Malware, distributed denial of service attacks, cross-site scripting) is complex. The NCR addresses this challenge by representing an Internet-like environment by employing a multitude of virtual machines and physical hardware augmented with traffic emulation, port/protocol/service vulnerability scanning, and data capture tools. Coupled with a structured test methodology, the PM can efficiently and effectively engage with the Range to gain cyberspace resiliency insights. The NCR capability, when applied, allows the DoD to incorporate cyber security early to avoid high cost integration at the end of the development life cycle. This paper provides an overview of the resources of the NCR which may be especially helpful for DoD PMs to find the best approach for testing the cyberspace resiliency of their systems under development.