Biblio

Edge computing supports the deployment of ubiquitous, smart services by providing computing and storage closer to terminal devices. However, ensuring the full security and privacy of computations performed at the edge is challenging due to resource limitation. This paper responds to this challenge and proposes an adaptive approach to defense randomization among the edge data centers via a stochastic game, whose solution corresponds to the optimal security deployment at the network's edge. Moreover, security risk is evaluated subjectively based on Prospect Theory to reflect realistic scenarios where the attacker and the edge system do not similarly perceive the status of the infrastructure. The results show that a non-deterministic defense policy yields better security compared to a static defense strategy.

In recent years, integrated circuits (ICs) have become significant for various industries and their security has been given greater priority, specifically in the supply chain. Budgetary constraints have compelled IC designers to offshore manufacturing to third-party companies. When the designer gets the manufactured ICs back, it is imperative to test for potential threats like hardware trojans (HT). In this paper, a novel multi-level game-theoretic framework is introduced to analyze the interactions between a malicious IC manufacturer and the tester. In particular, the game is formulated as a non-cooperative, zero-sum, repeated game using prospect theory (PT) that captures different players' rationalities under uncertainty. The repeated game is separated into a learning stage, in which the defender learns about the attacker's tendencies, and an actual game stage, where this learning is used. Experiments show great incentive for the attacker to deceive the defender about their actual rationality by "playing dumb" in the learning stage (deception). This scenario is captured using hypergame theory to model the attacker's view of the game. The optimal deception rationality of the attacker is analytically derived to maximize utility gain. For the defender, a first-step deception mitigation process is proposed to thwart the effects of deception. Simulation results show that the attacker can profit from the deception as it can successfully insert HTs in the manufactured ICs without being detected.