Biblio

Following the same trend of consumer electronics, safety-critical industries are starting to adopt Over-The-Air Software Updates (OTASU) on their embedded systems. The motivation behind this trend is twofold. On the one hand, OTASU offer several benefits to the product makers and users by improving or adding new functionality and services to the product without a complete redesign. On the other hand, the increasing connectivity trend makes OTASU a crucial cyber-security demand to download latest security patches. However, the application of OTASU in the safety-critical domain is not free of challenges, specially when considering the dramatic increase of software complexity and the resulting high computing performance demands. This is the mission of UP2DATE, a recently launched project funded within the European H2020 programme focused on new software update architectures for heterogeneous high-performance mixed-criticality systems. This paper gives an overview of UP2DATE and its foundations, which seeks to improve existing OTASU solutions by considering safety, security and availability from the ground up in an architecture that builds around composability and modularity.

The next generation of dependable embedded systems feature autonomy and higher levels of interconnection. Autonomy is commonly achieved with the support of artificial intelligence algorithms that pose high computing demands on the hardware platform, reaching a high performance scale. This involves a dramatic increase in software and hardware complexity, fact that together with the novelty of the technology, raises serious concerns regarding system dependability. Traditional approaches for certification require to demonstrate that the system will be acceptably safe to operate before it is deployed into service. The nature of autonomous systems, with potentially infinite scenarios, configurations and unanticipated interactions, makes it increasingly difficult to support such claim at design time. In this context, the extended networking technologies can be exploited to collect post-deployment evidence that serve to oversee whether safety assumptions are preserved during operation and to continuously improve the system through regular software updates. These software updates are not only convenient for critical bug fixing but also necessary for keeping the interconnected system resilient against security threats. However, such approach requires a recondition of the traditional certification practices.