Biblio

Cloud services are widely used to virtualize the management and actuation of the real-world the Internet of Things (IoT). Due to the increasing privacy concerns regarding querying untrusted cloud servers, query anonymity has become a critical issue to all the stakeholders which are related to assessment of the dependability and security of the IoT system. The paper presents our study on the problem of query receiver-anonymity in the cloud-based IoT system, where the trade-off between the offered query-anonymity and the incurred communication is considered. The paper will investigate whether the accepted worst-case communication cost is sufficient to achieve a specific query anonymity or not. By way of extensive theoretical analysis, it shows that the bounds of worst-case communication cost is quadratically increased as the offered level of anonymity is increased, and they are quadratic in the network diameter for the opposite range. Extensive simulation is conducted to verify the analytical assertions.

There is no doubt that security issues are on the rise and defense mechanisms are becoming one of the leading subjects for academic and industry experts. In this paper, we focus on the security domain and envision a new way of looking at the security life cycle. We utilize our vision to propose an asset-based approach to countermeasure zero day attacks. To evaluate our proposal, we built a prototype. The initial results are promising and indicate that our prototype will achieve its goal of detecting zero-day attacks.

Establishing a secret and reliable wireless communication is a challenging task that is of paramount importance. In this paper, we investigate the physical layer security of a legitimate transmission link between a user that assists an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) in detecting eavesdropping and jamming attacks in the presence of an adversary that is capable of conducting an eavesdropping or a jamming attack. The user is being faced by a challenge of whether to transmit, thus becoming vulnerable to an eavesdropping or a jamming attack, or to keep silent and consequently his/her transmission will be delayed. The adversary is also facing a challenge of whether to conduct an eavesdropping or a jamming attack that will not get him/her to be detected. We model the interactions between the user and the adversary as a two-state stochastic game. Explicit solutions characterize some properties while highlighting some interesting strategies that are being embraced by the user and the adversary. Results show that our proposed system outperform current systems in terms of communication secrecy.

The extensive use of information and communication technologies in power grid systems make them vulnerable to cyber-attacks. One class of cyber-attack is advanced persistent threats where highly skilled attackers can steal user authentication information's and then move laterally in the network, from host to host in a hidden manner, until they reach an attractive target. Once the presence of the attacker has been detected in the network, appropriate actions should be taken quickly to prevent the attacker going deeper. This paper presents a game theoretic approach to optimize the defense against an invader attempting to use a set of known vulnerabilities to reach critical nodes in the network. First, the network is modeled as a vulnerability multi-graph where the nodes represent physical hosts and edges the vulnerabilities that the attacker can exploit to move laterally from one host to another. Secondly, a two-player zero-sum Markov game is built where the states of the game represent the nodes of the vulnerability multi-graph graph and transitions correspond to the edge vulnerabilities that the attacker can exploit. The solution of the game gives the optimal strategy to disconnect vulnerable services and thus slow down the attack.

We introduce a novel mathematical model that treats network security as a game between cyber attackers and network administrators. The model takes the form of a zero-sum repeated game where each sub-game corresponds to a possible state of the attacker. Our formulation views state as the set of compromised edges in a graph opposed to the more traditional node-based view. This provides a more expressive model since it allows the defender to anticipate the direction of attack. Both players move independently and in continuous time allowing for the possibility of one player moving several times before the other does. This model shows that defense-in-depth is not always a rational strategy for budget constrained network administrators. Furthermore, a defender can dissuade a rational attacker from attempting to attack a network if the defense budget is sufficiently high. This means that a network administrator does not need to make their system completely free of vulnerabilities, they only to ensure the penalties for being caught outweigh the potential rewards gained.

Cloud storage is vulnerable to advanced persistent threats (APTs), in which an attacker launches stealthy, continuous, well-funded and targeted attacks on storage devices. In this paper, cumulative prospect theory (CPT) is applied to study the interactions between a defender of cloud storage and an APT attacker when each of them makes subjective decisions to choose the scan interval and attack interval, respectively. Both the probability weighting effect and the framing effect are applied to model the deviation of subjective decisions of end-users from the objective decisions governed by expected utility theory, under uncertain attack durations. Cumulative decision weights are used to describe the probability weighting effect and the value distortion functions are used to represent the framing effect of subjective APT attackers and defenders in the CPT-based APT defense game, rather than discrete decision weights, as in earlier prospect theoretic study of APT defense. The Nash equilibria of the CPT-based APT defense game are derived, showing that a subjective attacker becomes risk-seeking if the frame of reference for evaluating the utility is large, and becomes risk-averse if the frame of reference for evaluating the utility is small.

We present a framework for learning to describe finegrained visual differences between instances using attribute phrases. Attribute phrases capture distinguishing aspects of an object (e.g., “propeller on the nose” or “door near the wing” for airplanes) in a compositional manner. Instances within a category can be described by a set of these phrases and collectively they span the space of semantic attributes for a category. We collect a large dataset of such phrases by asking annotators to describe several visual differences between a pair of instances within a category. We then learn to describe and ground these phrases to images in the context of a reference game between a speaker and a listener. The goal of a speaker is to describe attributes of an image that allows the listener to correctly identify it within a pair. Data collected in a pairwise manner improves the ability of the speaker to generate, and the ability of the listener to interpret visual descriptions. Moreover, due to the compositionality of attribute phrases, the trained listeners can interpret descriptions not seen during training for image retrieval, and the speakers can generate attribute-based explanations for differences between previously unseen categories. We also show that embedding an image into the semantic space of attribute phrases derived from listeners offers 20% improvement in accuracy over existing attributebased representations on the FGVC-aircraft dataset.

Large-scale infrastructures are critical to economic and social development, and hence their continued performance and security are of high national importance. Such an infrastructure often is a system of systems, and its functionality critically depends on the inherent robustness of its constituent systems and its defense strategy for countering attacks. Additionally, interdependencies between the systems play another critical role in determining the infrastructure robustness specified by its survival probability. In this paper, we develop game-theoretic models between a defender and an attacker for a generic system of systems using inherent parameters and conditional survival probabilities that characterize the interdependencies. We derive Nash Equilibrium conditions for the cases of interdependent and independent systems of systems under sum-form utility functions. We derive expressions for the infrastructure survival probability that capture its dependence on cost and system parameters, and also on dependencies that are specified by conditional probabilities. We apply the results to cyber-physical systems which show the effects on system survival probability due to defense and attack intensities, inherent robustness, unit cost, target valuation, and interdependencies.

In this paper, we propose a variant of searchable public-key encryption named hidden-token searchable public-key encryption with two new security properties: token anonymity and one-token-per-trapdoor. With the former security notion, the client can obtain the search token from the data owner without revealing any information about the underlying keyword. Meanwhile, the client cannot derive more than one token from one trapdoor generated by the data owner according to the latter security notion. Furthermore, we present a concrete hiddentoken searchable public-key encryption scheme together with the security proofs in the random oracle model.

In this paper, a game-theoretical solution concept is utilized to tackle the collusion attack in a SDN-based framework. In our proposed setting, the defenders (i.e., switches) are incentivized not to collude with the attackers in a repeated-game setting that utilizes a reputation system. We first illustrate our model and its components. We then use a socio-rational approach to provide a new anti-collusion solution that shows cooperation with the SDN controller is always Nash Equilibrium due to the existence of a long-term utility function in our model.

Verifying that hardware design implementations adhere to specifications is a time intensive and sometimes intractable problem due to the massive size of the system's state space. Formal methods techniques can be used to prove certain tractable specification properties; however, they are expensive, and often require subject matter experts to develop and solve. Nonetheless, hardware verification is a critical process to ensure security and safety properties are met, and encapsulates problems associated with trust and reliability. For complex designs where coverage of the entire state space is unattainable, prioritizing regions most vulnerable to security or reliability threats would allow efficient allocation of valuable verification resources. Stackelberg security games model interactions between a defender, whose goal is to assign resources to protect a set of targets, and an attacker, who aims to inflict maximum damage on the targets after first observing the defender's strategy. In equilibrium, the defender has an optimal security deployment strategy, given the attacker's best response. We apply this Stackelberg security framework to synthesized hardware implementations using the design's network structure and logic to inform defender valuations and verification costs. The defender's strategy in equilibrium is thus interpreted as a prioritization of the allocation of verification resources in the presence of an adversary. We demonstrate this technique on several open-source synthesized hardware designs.

With the fast development of autonomous driving and vehicular communication technologies, intelligent transportation systems that are based on VANET (Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network) have shown great promise. For instance, through V2V (Vehicle-to-Vehicle) and V2I (Vehicle-to-Infrastructure) communication, intelligent intersections allow more fine-grained control of vehicle crossings and significantly enhance traffic efficiency. However, the performance and safety of these VANET-based systems could be seriously impaired by communication delays and packet losses, which may be caused by network congestion or by malicious attacks that target communication timing behavior. In this paper, we quantitatively model and analyze some of the timing and security issues in transportation networks with VANET-based intelligent intersections. In particular, we demonstrate how communication delays may affect the performance and safety of a single intersection and of multiple interconnected intersections, and present our delay-tolerant intersection management protocols. We also discuss the issues of such protocols when the vehicles are non-cooperative and how they may be addressed with game theory.

Security evaluation of diverse SDN frameworks is of significant importance to design resilient systems and deal with attacks. Focused on SDN scenarios, a game-theoretic model is proposed to analyze their security performance in existing SDN architectures. The model can describe specific traits in different structures, represent several types of information of players (attacker and defender) and quantitatively calculate systems' reliability. Simulation results illustrate dynamic SDN structures have distinct security improvement over static ones. Besides, effective dynamic scheduling mechanisms adopted in dynamic systems can enhance their security further.

Incentive-driven advanced attacks have become a major concern to cyber-security. Traditional defense techniques that adopt a passive and static approach by assuming a fixed attack type are insufficient in the face of highly adaptive and stealthy attacks. In particular, a passive defense approach often creates information asymmetry where the attacker knows more about the defender. To this end, moving target defense (MTD) has emerged as a promising way to reverse this information asymmetry. The main idea of MTD is to (continuously) change certain aspects of the system under control to increase the attacker's uncertainty, which in turn increases attack cost/complexity and reduces the chance of a successful exploit in a given amount of time. In this paper, we go one step beyond and show that MTD can be further improved when combined with information disclosure. In particular, we consider that the defender adopts a MTD strategy to protect a critical resource across a network of nodes, and propose a Bayesian Stackelberg game model with the defender as the leader and the attacker as the follower. After fully characterizing the defender's optimal migration strategies, we show that the defender can design a signaling scheme to exploit the uncertainty created by MTD to further affect the attacker's behavior for its own advantage. We obtain conditions under which signaling is useful, and show that strategic information disclosure can be a promising way to further reverse the information asymmetry and achieve more efficient active defense.

With the growing number of cyberattack incidents, organizations are required to have proactive knowledge on the cybersecurity landscape for efficiently defending their resources. To achieve this, organizations must develop the culture of sharing their threat information with others for effectively assessing the associated risks. However, sharing cybersecurity information is costly for the organizations due to the fact that the information conveys sensitive and private data. Hence, making the decision for sharing information is a challenging task and requires to resolve the trade-off between sharing advantages and privacy exposure. On the other hand, cybersecurity information exchange (CYBEX) management is crucial in stabilizing the system through setting the correct values for participation fees and sharing incentives. In this work, we model the interaction of organizations, CYBEX, and attackers involved in a sharing system using dynamic game. With devising appropriate payoff models for each player, we analyze the best strategies of the entities by incorporating the organizations' privacy component in the sharing model. Using the best response analysis, the simulation results demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed framework.

We report on our research on proving the security of multi-party cryptographic protocols using the EASYCRYPT proof assistant. We work in the computational model using the sequence of games approach, and define honest-butcurious (semi-honest) security using a variation of the real/ideal paradigm in which, for each protocol party, an adversary chooses protocol inputs in an attempt to distinguish the party's real and ideal games. Our proofs are information-theoretic, instead of being based on complexity theory and computational assumptions. We employ oracles (e.g., random oracles for hashing) whose encapsulated states depend on dynamically-made, nonprogrammable random choices. By limiting an adversary's oracle use, one may obtain concrete upper bounds on the distances between a party's real and ideal games that are expressed in terms of game parameters. Furthermore, our proofs work for adaptive adversaries, ones that, when choosing the value of a protocol input, may condition this choice on their current protocol view and oracle knowledge. We provide an analysis in EASYCRYPT of a three party private count retrieval protocol. We emphasize the lessons learned from completing this proof.

The theory of robust control models the controller-disturbance interaction as a game where disturbance is nonstrategic. The proviso of a deliberately malicious (strategic) attacker should be considered to increase the robustness of infrastructure systems. This has become especially important since many IT systems supporting critical functionalities are vulnerable to exploits by attackers. While the usefulness of game theory methods for modeling cyber-security is well established in the literature, new game theoretic models of cyber-physical security are needed for deriving useful insights on "optimal" attack plans and defender responses, both in terms of allocation of resources and operational strategies of these players. This whitepaper presents some progress and challenges in using game-theoretic models for security of infrastructure networks. Main insights from the following models are presented: (i) Network security game on flow networks under strategic edge disruptions; (ii) Interdiction problem on distribution networks under node disruptions; (iii) Inspection game to monitor commercial non-technical losses (e.g. energy diversion); and (iv) Interdependent security game of networked control systems under communication failures. These models can be used to analyze the attacker-defender interactions in a class of cyber-physical security scenarios.

CAPTCHA is a type of challenge-response test to ensure that the response is only generated by humans and not by computerized robots. CAPTCHA are getting harder as because usage of latest advanced pattern recognition and machine learning algorithms are capable of solving simpler CAPTCHA. However, some enhancement procedures make the CAPTCHAs too difficult to be recognized by the human. This paper resolves the problem by next generation human-friendly mini game-CAPTCHA for quantifying the usability of CAPTCHAs.

Encryption is often not sufficient to secure communication, since it does not hide that communication takes place or who is communicating with whom. Covert channels hide the very existence of communication enabling individuals to communicate secretly. Previous work proposed a covert channel hidden inside multi-player first person shooter online game traffic (FPSCC). FPSCC has a low bit rate, but it is practically impossible to eliminate other than by blocking the overt game trac. This paper shows that with knowledge of the channel’s encoding and using machine learning techniques, FPSCC can be detected with an accuracy of 95% or higher.

Devices in the internet of things (IoT) are frequently (i) resource-constrained, and (ii) deployed in unmonitored, physically unsecured environments. Securing these devices requires tractable cryptographic protocols, as well as cost effective tamper resistance solutions. We propose and evaluate cryptographic protocols that leverage physical unclonable functions (PUFs): circuits whose input to output mapping depends on the unique characteristics of the physical hardware on which it is executed. PUF-based protocols have the benefit of minimizing private key exposure, as well as providing cost-effective tamper resistance. We present and experimentally evaluate an elliptic curve based variant of a theoretical PUF-based authentication protocol proposed previously in the literature. Our work improves over an existing proof-of-concept implementation, which relied on the discrete logarithm problem as proposed in the original work. In contrast, our construction uses elliptic curve cryptography, which substantially reduces the computational and storage burden on the device. We describe PUF-based algorithms for device enrollment, authentication, decryption, and digital signature generation. The performance of each construction is experimentally evaluated on a resource-constrained device to demonstrate tractability in the IoT domain. We demonstrate that our implementation achieves practical performance results, while also providing realistic security. Our work demonstrates that PUF-based protocols may be practically and securely deployed on low-cost resource-constrained IoT devices.

In this paper we use car games as a simulator for real automobiles, and generate driving logs that contain the vehicle data. This includes values for parameters like gear used, speed, left turns taken, right turns taken, accelerator, braking and so on. From these parameters we have derived some more additional parameters and analyzed them. As the input from automobile driver is only routine driving, no explicit feedback is required; hence there are more chances of being able to accurately profile the driver. Experimentation and analysis from this logged data shows possibility that driver profiling can be done from vehicle data. Since the profiles are unique, these can be further used for a wide range of applications and can successfully exhibit typical driving characteristics of each user.

Security breaches and attacks are becoming a more critical and, simultaneously, a challenging problems for many firms in networked supply chains. A game theory-based model is developed to investigate how interdependent feature of information security risk influence the optimal strategy of firms to invest in information security. The equilibrium levels of information security investment under non-cooperative game condition are compared with socially optimal solutions. The results show that the infectious risks often induce firms to invest inefficiently whereas trust risks lead to overinvest in information security. We also find that firm's investment may not necessarily monotonous changes with infectious risks and trust risks in a centralized case. Furthermore, relative to the socially efficient level, firms facing infectious risks may invest excessively depending on whether trust risks is large enough.

Game theory serves as a powerful tool for distributed optimization in multiagent systems in different applications. In this paper we consider multiagent systems that can be modeled as a potential game whose potential function coincides with a global objective function to be maximized. This approach renders the agents the strategic decision makers and the corresponding optimization problem the problem of learning an optimal equilibruim point in the designed game. In distinction from the existing works on the topic of payoff-based learning, we deal here with the systems where agents have neither memory nor ability for communication, and they base their decision only on the currently played action and the experienced payoff. Because of these restrictions, we use the methods of reinforcement learning, stochastic approximation, and learning automata extensively reviewed and analyzed in [3], [9]. These methods allow us to set up the agent dynamics that moves the game out of inefficient Nash equilibria and leads it close to an optimal one in both cases of discrete and continuous action sets.

The rate at which cyber-attacks are increasing globally portrays a terrifying picture upfront. The main dynamics of such attacks could be studied in terms of the actions of attackers and defenders in a cyber-security game. However currently little research has taken place to study such interactions. In this paper we use behavioral game theory and try to investigate the role of certain actions taken by attackers and defenders in a simulated cyber-attack scenario of defacing a website. We choose a Reinforcement Learning (RL) model to represent a simulated attacker and a defender in a 2×4 cyber-security game where each of the 2 players could take up to 4 actions. A pair of model participants were computationally simulated across 1000 simulations where each pair played at most 30 rounds in the game. The goal of the attacker was to deface the website and the goal of the defender was to prevent the attacker from doing so. Our results show that the actions taken by both the attackers and defenders are a function of attention paid by these roles to their recently obtained outcomes. It was observed that if attacker pays more attention to recent outcomes then he is more likely to perform attack actions. We discuss the implication of our results on the evolution of dynamics between attackers and defenders in cyber-security games.

The initiative to protect against future cyber crimes requires a collaborative effort from all types of agencies spanning industry, academia, federal institutions, and military agencies. Therefore, a Cybersecurity Information Exchange (CYBEX) framework is required to facilitate breach/patch related information sharing among the participants (firms) to combat cyber attacks. In this paper, we formulate a non-cooperative cybersecurity information sharing game that can guide: (i) the firms (players)1 to independently decide whether to “participate in CYBEX and share” or not; (ii) the CYBEX framework to utilize the participation cost dynamically as incentive (to attract firms toward self-enforced sharing) and as a charge (to increase revenue). We analyze the game from an evolutionary game-theoretic strategy and determine the conditions under which the players' self-enforced evolutionary stability can be achieved. We present a distributed learning heuristic to attain the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) under various conditions. We also show how CYBEX can wisely vary its pricing for participation to increase sharing as well as its own revenue, eventually evolving toward a win-win situation.