Biblio

Passwords are generally used to keep unauthorized users out of the system. Password hacking has become more common as the number of internet users has extended, causing a slew of issues. These problems include stealing the confidential information of a company or a country by adversaries which harm the economy or the security of the organization. Hackers often use password hacking for criminal activities. It is indispensable to protect passwords from hackers. There are many hacking methods such as credential stuffing, social engineering, traffic interception, and password spraying for hacking the passwords. So, in order to control hacking, there are hashing algorithms that are mostly used to hash passwords making password cracking more difficult. In this proposed work, different hashing algorithms such as SHA-1, MD-5, Salted MD-5, SHA-256, and SHA-512 have been used. And the MySQL database is used to store the hash values of passwords that are generated using various hash functions. It is proven that SHA is better than MD-5 and Salted MD-5. Whereas in the SHA family, SHA-512 and SHA-256 have their own benefits. Four new hashing functions have been proposed using the combination of existing algorithms like SHA-256, and SHA-512 namely SHA-256\_with\_SHA-256, SHA-256\_ With\_SHA-512,SHA-512\_With\_SHA-512,and SHA-512\_ With\_SHA-256. They provide strong hash value for passwords by which the security of passwords increases, and hacking can be controlled to an extent.

Historically, attackers have sought to manipulate programs through the corruption of return addresses, function pointers, and other control flow data. However, as protections like ASLR, stack canaries, and no-execute bits have made such attacks more difficult, data-oriented exploits have received increasing attention. Such exploits try to subvert a program by reading or writing non-control data, without introducing any foreign code or violating the program’s legitimate control flow graph. Recently, a data-oriented exploitation technique called memory cartography was introduced, in which an attacker navigates between allocated memory regions using a precompiled map to disclose sensitive program data. The efficacy of memory cartography is dependent on inter-region pointers being located at constant offsets within memory regions; thus, cartographic attacks are difficult to launch against memory regions like heaps and stacks that have nondeterministic layouts. In this paper, we lower the barrier to successful attacks against nondeterministic memory, demonstrating that pointers between regions of memory often possess unique “signatures” that allow attackers to identify them with high accuracy. These signatures are accurate even when the pointers reside in non-deterministic memory areas. In many real-world programs, this allows an attacker that is capable of reading bytes from a single heap to access all of process memory. Our findings underscore the importance of memory isolation via separate address spaces.