Biblio
Due to a rapid revaluation in a virtualization environment, Virtual Machines (VMs) are target point for an attacker to gain privileged access of the virtual infrastructure. The Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) such as malware, rootkit, spyware, etc. are more potent to bypass the existing defense mechanisms designed for VM. To address this issue, Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) emerged as a promising approach that monitors run state of the VM externally from hypervisor. However, limitation of VMI lies with semantic gap. An open source tool called LibVMI address the semantic gap. Memory Forensic Analysis (MFA) tool such as Volatility can also be used to address the semantic gap. But, it needs to capture a memory dump (RAM) as input. Memory dump acquires time and its analysis time is highly crucial if Intrusion Detection System IDS (IDS) depends on the data supplied by FAM or VMI tool. In this work, live virtual machine RAM dump acquire time of LibVMI is measured. In addition, captured memory dump analysis time consumed by Volatility is measured and compared with other memory analyzer such as Rekall. It is observed through experimental results that, Rekall takes more execution time as compared to Volatility for most of the plugins. Further, Volatility and Rekall are compared with LibVMI. It is noticed that examining the volatile data through LibVMI is faster as it eliminates memory dump acquire time.
In the present paper, we present our approach for the transformation of workflow applications based on institution theory. The workflow application is modeled with UML Activity Diagram(UML AD). Then, for a formal verification purposes, the graphical model will be translated to an Event-B specification. Institution theory will be used in two levels. First, we defined a local semantic for UML AD and Event B specification using a categorical description of each one. Second, we defined institution comorphism to link the two defined institutions. The theoretical foundations of our approach will be studied in the same mathematical framework since the use of institution theory. The resulted Event-B specification, after applying the transformation approach, will be used for the formal verification of functional proprieties and the verification of absences of problems such deadlock. Additionally, with the institution comorphism, we define a semantic correctness and coherence of the model transformation.
The emergence of Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS) in today's business world is still steadily progressing to new dimensions. Although they bring many new advantages to business processes and enable automation and a wider range of service capability, they also propose a variety of new challenges. One major challenge, which is introduced by such System-of-Systems (SoS), lies in the security aspect. As security may not have had that significant role in traditional embedded system engineering, a generic way to measure the level of security within an ICPS would provide a significant benefit for system engineers and involved stakeholders. Even though many security metrics and frameworks exist, most of them insufficiently consider an SoS context and the challenges of such environments. Therefore, we aim to define a security metric for ICPS, which measures the level of security during the system design, tests, and integration as well as at runtime. For this, we try to focus on a semantic point of view, which on one hand has not been considered in security metric definitions yet, and on the other hand allows us to handle the complexity of SoS architectures. Furthermore, our approach allows combining the critical characteristics of an ICPS, like uncertainty, required reliability, multi-criticality and safety aspects.
The storage efficiency of hash codes and their application in the fast approximate nearest neighbor search, along with the explosion in the size of available labeled image datasets caused an intensive interest in developing learning based hash algorithms recently. In this paper, we present a learning based hash algorithm that utilize ordinal information of feature vectors. We have proposed a novel mathematically differentiable approximation of argmax function for this hash algorithm. It has enabled seamless integration of hash function with deep neural network architecture which can exploit the rich feature vectors generated by convolutional neural networks. We have also proposed a loss function for the case that the hash code is not binary and its entries are digits of arbitrary k-ary base. The resultant model comprised of feature vector generation and hashing layer is amenable to end-to-end training using gradient descent methods. In contrast to the majority of current hashing algorithms that are either not learning based or use hand-crafted feature vectors as input, simultaneous training of the components of our system results in better optimization. Extensive evaluations on NUS-WIDE, CIFAR-10 and MIRFlickr benchmarks show that the proposed algorithm outperforms state-of-art and classical data agnostic, unsupervised and supervised hashing methods by 2.6% to 19.8% mean average precision under various settings.
Information Flow Control (IFC) is a collection of techniques for ensuring a no-write-down no-read-up style security policy known as noninterference. Traditional methods for both static (e.g. type systems) and dynamic (e.g. runtime monitors) IFC suffer from untenable numbers of false alarms on real-world programs. Secure Multi-Execution (SME) promises to provide secure information flow control without modifying the behaviour of already secure programs, a property commonly referred to as transparency. Implementations of SME exist for the web in the form of the FlowFox browser and as plug-ins to several programming languages. Furthermore, SME can in theory work in a black-box manner, meaning that it can be programming language agnostic, making it perfect for securing legacy or third-party systems. As such SME, and its variants like Multiple Facets (MF) and Faceted Secure Multi-Execution (FSME), appear to be a family of panaceas for the security engineer. The question is, how come, given all these advantages, that these techniques are not ubiquitous in practice? The answer lies, partially, in the issue of runtime and memory overhead. SME and its variants are prohibitively expensive to deploy in many non-trivial situations. The natural question is why is this the case? On the surface, the reason is simple. The techniques in the SME family all rely on the idea of multi-execution, running all or parts of a program multiple times to achieve noninterference. Naturally, this causes some overhead. However, the predominant thinking in the IFC community has been that these overheads can be overcome. In this paper we argue that there are fundamental reasons to expect this not to be the case and prove two key theorems: (1) All transparent enforcement is polynomial time equivalent to multi-execution. (2) All black-box enforcement takes time exponential in the number of principals in the security lattice. Our methods also allow us to answer, in the affirmative, an open question about the possibility of secure and transparent enforcement of a security condition known as Termination Insensitive Noninterference.
Over the last decade, a globalization of the software industry took place, which facilitated the sharing and reuse of code across existing project boundaries. At the same time, such global reuse also introduces new challenges to the software engineering community, with not only components but also their problems and vulnerabilities being now shared. For example, vulnerabilities found in APIs no longer affect only individual projects but instead might spread across projects and even global software ecosystem borders. Tracing these vulnerabilities at a global scale becomes an inherently difficult task since many of the existing resources required for such analysis still rely on proprietary knowledge representation. In this research, we introduce an ontology-based knowledge modeling approach that can eliminate such information silos. More specifically, we focus on linking security knowledge with other software knowledge to improve traceability and trust in software products (APIs). Our approach takes advantage of the Semantic Web and its reasoning services, to trace and assess the impact of security vulnerabilities across project boundaries. We present a case study, to illustrate the applicability and flexibility of our ontological modeling approach by tracing vulnerabilities across project and resource boundaries.
The Semantic Web can be used to enable the interoperability of IoT devices and to annotate their functional and nonfunctional properties, including security and privacy. In this paper, we will show how to use the ontology and JSON-LD to annotate connectivity, security and privacy properties of IoT devices. Out of that, we will present our prototype for a lightweight, secure application level protocol wrapper that ensures communication consistency, secrecy and integrity for low cost IoT devices like the ESP8266 and Photon particle.
Most network traffic analysis applications are designed to discover malicious activity by only relying on high-level flow-based message properties. However, to detect security breaches that are specifically designed to target one network (e.g., Advanced Persistent Threats), deep packet inspection and anomaly detection are indispensible. In this paper, we focus on how we can support experts in discovering whether anomalies at message level imply a security risk at network level. In SNAPS (Semantic Network traffic Analysis through Projection and Selection), we provide a bottom-up pixel-oriented approach for network traffic analysis where the expert starts with low-level anomalies and iteratively gains insight in higher level events through the creation of multiple selections of interest in parallel. The tight integration between visualization and machine learning enables the expert to iteratively refine anomaly scores, making the approach suitable for both post-traffic analysis and online monitoring tasks. To illustrate the effectiveness of this approach, we present example explorations on two real-world data sets for the detection and understanding of potential Advanced Persistent Threats in progress.
In this paper we propose a twitter sentiment analytics that mines for opinion polarity about a given topic. Most of current semantic sentiment analytics depends on polarity lexicons. However, many key tone words are frequently bipolar. In this paper we demonstrate a technique which can accommodate the bipolarity of tone words by context sensitive tone lexicon learning mechanism where the context is modeled by the semantic neighborhood of the main target. Performance analysis shows that ability to contextualize the tone word polarity significantly improves the accuracy.
In this work, we applied deep semantic analysis, and machine learning and deep learning techniques, to capture inherent characteristics of email text, and classify emails as phishing or non -phishing.
This paper aims to explain static analysis techniques in detail, and to highlight the weaknesses and challenges which face it. To this end, more than 80 static analysis-based framework have been studied, and in their light, the process of detecting malicious applications has been divided into four phases that were explained in a schematic manner. Also, the features that is used in static analysis were discussed in detail by dividing it into four categories namely, Manifest-based features, code-based features, semantic features and app's metadata-based features. Also, the challenges facing methods based on static analysis were discussed in detail. Finally, a case study was conducted to test the strength of some known commercial antivirus and one of the stat-of-art academic static analysis frameworks against obfuscation techniques used by developers of malicious applications. The results showed a significant impact on the performance of the most tested antiviruses and frameworks, which is reflecting the urgent need for more accurately tools.
Correct compilers perform program transformations preserving input/output behaviours of programs. Yet, correctness does not prevent program optimisations from introducing information-flow leaks that would make the target program more vulnerable to side-channel attacks than the source program. To tackle this problem, we propose a notion of Information-Flow Preserving (IFP) program transformation which ensures that a target program is no more vulnerable to passive side-channel attacks than a source program. To protect against a wide range of attacks, we model an attacker who is granted arbitrary memory accesses for a pre-defined set of observation points. We propose a compositional proof principle for proving that a transformation is IFP. Using this principle, we show how a translation validation technique can be used to automatically verify and even close information-flow leaks introduced by standard compiler passes such as dead-store elimination and register allocation. The technique has been experimentally validated on the CompCert C compiler.
Malware authors are known to reuse existing code, this development process results in software evolution and a sequence of versions of a malware family containing functions that show a divergence from the initial version. This paper proposes the term evolved similarity to account for this gradual divergence of similarity across the version history of a malware family. While existing techniques are able to match functions in different versions of malware, these techniques work best when the version changes are relatively small. This paper introduces the concept of evolved similarity and presents automated Evolved Similarity Techniques (EST). EST differs from existing malware function similarity techniques by focusing on the identification of significantly modified functions in adjacent malware versions and may also be used to identify function similarity in malware samples that differ by several versions. The challenge in identifying evolved malware function pairs lies in identifying features that are relatively invariant across evolved code. The research in this paper makes use of the function call graph to establish these features and then demonstrates the use of these techniques using Zeus malware.