Biblio
Blockchain networks which employ Proof-of-Work in their consensus mechanism may face inconsistencies in the form of forks. These forks are usually resolved through the application of block selection rules (such as the Nakamoto consensus). In this paper, we investigate the cause and length of forks for the Bitcoin network. We develop theoretical formulas which model the Bitcoin consensus and network protocols, based on an Erdös-Rényi random graph construction of the overlay network of peers. Our theoretical model addresses the effect of key parameters on the fork occurrence probability, such as block propagation delay, network bandwidth, and block size. We also leverage this model to estimate the weight of fork branches. Our model is implemented using the network simulator OMNET++ and validated by historical Bitcoin data. We show that under current conditions, Bitcoin will not benefit from increasing the number of connections per node.
5G, the fifth generation of mobile communication networks, is considered as one of the main IoT enablers. Connecting billions of things, 5G/IoT will be dealing with trillions of GBytes of data. Securing such large amounts of data is a very challenging task. Collected data varies from simple temperature measurements to more critical transaction data. Thus, applying uniform security measures is a waste of resources (processing, memory, and network bandwidth). Alternatively, a multi-level security model needs to be applied according to the varying requirements. In this paper, we present a multi-level security scheme (BLP) applied originally in the information security domain. We review its application in the network domain, and propose a modified version of BLP for the 5G/IoT case. The proposed model is proven to be secure and compliant with the model rules.
Traditional Anti-virus technology is primarily based on static analysis and dynamic monitoring. However, both technologies are heavily depended on application files, which increase the risk of being attacked, wasting of time and network bandwidth. In this study, we propose a new graph-based method, through which we can preliminary detect malicious URL without application file. First, the relationship between URLs can be found through the relationship between people and URLs. Then the association rules can be mined with confidence of each frequent URLs. Secondly, the networks of URLs was built through the association rules. When the networks of URLs were finished, we clustered the date with modularity to detect communities and every community represents different types of URLs. We suppose that a URL has association with one community, then the URL is malicious probably. In our experiments, we successfully captured 82 % of malicious samples, getting a higher capture than using traditional methods.
A botnet in mobile networks is a collection of compromised nodes due to mobile malware, which are able to perform coordinated attacks. Different from Internet botnets, mobile botnets do not need to propagate using centralized infrastructures, but can keep compromising vulnerable nodes in close proximity and evolving organically via data forwarding. Such a distributed mechanism relies heavily on node mobility as well as wireless links, therefore breaks down the underlying premise in existing epidemic modeling for Internet botnets. In this paper, we adopt a stochastic approach to study the evolution and impact of mobile botnets. We find that node mobility can be a trigger to botnet propagation storms: the average size (i.e., number of compromised nodes) of a botnet increases quadratically over time if the mobility range that each node can reach exceeds a threshold; otherwise, the botnet can only contaminate a limited number of nodes with average size always bounded above. This also reveals that mobile botnets can propagate at the fastest rate of quadratic growth in size, which is substantially slower than the exponential growth of Internet botnets. To measure the denial-of-service impact of a mobile botnet, we define a new metric, called last chipper time, which is the last time that service requests, even partially, can still be processed on time as the botnet keeps propagating and launching attacks. The last chipper time is identified to decrease at most on the order of 1/√B, where B is the network bandwidth. This result reveals that although increasing network bandwidth can help with mobile services; at the same time, it can indeed escalate the risk for services being disrupted by mobile botnets.