Biblio

The data-driven period produces more and more security-related challenges that even experts can hardly deal with. One of the most complex threats is ransomware, which is very taxing and devastating to detect and mainly prevent. Our research methods showed significant results in identifying ransomware processes using the honeypot concept augmented with symbolic linking to reduce damage made to the file system. The CIA (confidentiality, integrity, availability) metrics have been adhered to. We propose to optimize the malware process termination procedure and introduce an artificial intelligence-human collaboration to enhance ransomware classification and detection.

The rapid progress experienced in the Internet of Things (IoT) space is one that has introduced new and unique challenges for cybersecurity and IoT-Forensics. One of these problems is how digital forensics and incident response (DFIR) are handled in IoT. Since enormous users use IoT platforms to accomplish their day to day task, massive amounts of data streams are transferred with limited hardware resources; conducting DFIR needs a new approach to mitigate digital evidence and incident response challenges owing to the facts that there are no unified standard or classified principles for IoT forensics. Today's IoT DFIR relies on self-defined best practices and experiences. Given these challenges, IoT-related incidents need a more structured approach in identifying problems of DFIR. In this paper, we examined the major DFIR challenges in IoT by exploring the different phases involved in a DFIR when responding to IoT-related incidents. This study aims to provide researchers and practitioners a road-map that will help improve the standards of IoT security and DFIR.

This article describes attacks methods, vectors and technics used by threat actors during pandemic situations in the world. Identifies common targets of threat actors and cyber-attack tactics. The article analyzes cybersecurity challenges and specifies possible solutions and improvements in cybersecurity. Defines cybersecurity controls, which should be taken against analyzed attack vectors.

Despite their popularity, Security Operation Centers (SOCs) are facing increasing challenges and pressure due to the growing volume, velocity and variety of the IT infrastructure and security data observed on a daily basis. Due to the mixed performance of current technological solutions, e.g. IDS and SIEM, there is an over-reliance on manual analysis of the events by human security analysts. This creates huge backlogs and slow down considerably the resolution of critical security events. Obvious solutions include increasing accuracy and efficiency in the automation of crucial aspects of the SOC workflow, such as the event classification and prioritization. In the current paper, we present a new approach for SOC event classification by identifying a set of new features using graphical analysis and classifying using a deep neural network model. Experimental evaluation using real SOC event log data yields very encouraging results in terms of classification accuracy.

Cyber-attacks against cloud storage infrastructure e.g. Amazon S3 and Google Cloud Storage, have increased in recent years. One reason for this development is the rising adoption of cloud storage for various purposes. Robust counter-measures are therefore required to tackle these attacks especially as traditional techniques are not appropriate for the evolving attacks. We propose a two-pronged approach to address these challenges in this paper. The first approach involves dynamic snapshotting and recovery strategies to detect and partially neutralize security events. The second approach builds on the initial step by automatically correlating the generated alerts with cloud event log, to extract actionable intelligence for incident response. Thus, malicious activities are investigated, identified and eliminated. This approach is implemented in SlingShot, a cloud threat detection and incident response system which extends our earlier work - CSBAuditor, which implements the first step. The proposed techniques work together in near real time to mitigate the aforementioned security issues on Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Google Cloud Platform (GCP). We evaluated our techniques using real cloud attacks implemented with static and dynamic methods. The average Mean Time to Detect is 30 seconds for both providers, while the Mean Time to Respond is 25 minutes and 90 minutes for AWS and GCP respectively. Thus, our proposal effectively tackles contemporary cloud attacks.

We consider the possibility of detecting malicious behaviors of the advanced persistent threat (APT) at endpoints during incident response or forensics investigations. Specifically, we study the case where third-party sensors are not available; our observables are obtained solely from inherent digital artifacts of Windows operating systems. What is of particular interest is an artifact called the Application Compatibility Cache (Shimcache). As it is not apparent from the Shimcache when a file has been executed, we propose an algorithm of estimating the time of file execution up to an interval. We also show guarantees of the proposed algorithm's performance and various possible extensions that can improve the estimation. Finally, combining this approach with methods of machine learning, as well as information from other digital artifacts, we design a prototype system called XTEC and demonstrate that it can help hunt for the APT in a real-world case study.

The systematic integration of the Internet of Things (IoT) and Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) into the supply chain to increase operational efficiency and quality has also introduced new complexities to the threat landscape. The myriad of sensors could increase data collection capabilities for businesses to facilitate process automation aided by Artificial Intelligence (AI) but without adopting an appropriate Security-by-Design framework, threat detection and response are destined to fail. The emerging concept of Smart Workplace incorporates many CPS (e.g. Robots and Drones) to execute tasks alongside Employees both of which can be exploited as Insider Threats. We introduce and discuss forensic-readiness, liability attribution and the ability to track moving Smart SPS Objects to support modern Digital Forensics and Incident Response (DFIR) within a defence-in-depth strategy. We present a framework to facilitate the tracking of object behaviour within Smart Controlled Business Environments (SCBE) to support resilience by enabling proactive insider threat detection. Several components of the framework were piloted in a company to discuss a real-life case study and demonstrate anomaly detection and the emerging of behavioural patterns according to objects' movement with relation to their job role, workspace position and nearest entry or exit. The empirical data was collected from a Bluetooth-based Proximity Monitoring Solution. Furthermore, a key strength of the framework is a federated Blockchain (BC) model to achieve forensic-readiness by establishing a digital Chain-of-Custody (CoC) and a collaborative environment for CPS to qualify as Digital Witnesses (DW) to support post-incident investigations.

Intro: Computer network defense has models for attacks and incidents comprised of multiple attacks after the fact. However, we lack an evidence-based model the likelihood and intensity of attacks and incidents. Purpose: We propose a model of global capability advancement, the adversarial capability chain (ACC), to fit this need. The model enables cyber risk analysis to better understand the costs for an adversary to attack a system, which directly influences the cost to defend it. Method: The model is based on four historical studies of adversarial capabilities: capability to exploit Windows XP, to exploit the Android API, to exploit Apache, and to administer compromised industrial control systems. Result: We propose the ACC with five phases: Discovery, Validation, Escalation, Democratization, and Ubiquity. We use the four case studies as examples as to how the ACC can be applied and used to predict attack likelihood and intensity.

Up-to-date studies and surveys regarding IT security show, that companies of every size and branch nowadays are faced with the growing risk of cyber crime. Many tools, standards and best practices are in place to support enterprise IT security experts in dealing with the upcoming risks, whereas meanwhile especially small and medium sized enterprises(SMEs) feel helpless struggling with the growing threats. This article describes an approach, how SMEs can attain high quality assurance whether they are a victim of cyber crime, what kind of damage resulted from a certain attack and in what way remediation can be done. The focus on all steps of the analysis lies in the economic feasibility and the typical environment of SMEs.