Biblio

The Internet of Things (IoT) has enabled the rapid pace of the use of communication technology and infiltration of technical systems in a digital world. In terms of power systems generation and operation, a reliable solution for substation automation and smart grid communication is the IEC 61850 standard. It has a robust modelling structure for monitoring, protection, and control and management systems in substations and across the grid. Modern communication technologies are destined for internet use for remote monitoring, settings, and data recovery. However, the communication network is exposed to cyber threats and evident risks in security defense of automated power systems. To tackle these vulnerabilities, the IEC 62351 standard aims to improve security in handling the communication and data transfers in power system automation. This paper discusses the different security measures in communication, information and cyber security solutions in power systems. To further illustrate the novel communication and security schemes of digital substations, a case study using the Victoria University Zone Substation (VUZS) simulator for cybersecurity assessment has been instigated.

IEC 61850 is an international standard that is widely used in substation automation systems (SAS) in smart grids. During its development, security was not considered thus leaving SAS vulnerable to attacks from adversaries. IEC 62351 was developed to provide security recommendations for SAS against (distributed) denial-of-service, replay, alteration, spoofing and detection of devices attacks. However, real-time communications, which require protocols such as Generic Object-Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) to function efficiently, cannot implement these recommendations due to latency constraints. There has been researching that sought to improve the security of GOOSE messages, however, some cannot be practically implemented due to hardware requirements while others are theoretical, even though latency requirements were met. This research investigates the possibility of encrypting GOOSE messages with One- Time Pads (OTP), leveraging the fact that encryption/decryption processes require the random generation of OTPs and modulo addition (XOR), which could be a realistic approach to secure GOOSE while maintaining latency requirements. Results show that GOOSE messages can be encrypted with some future work required.

Critical Infrastructure represents the basic facilities, services and installations necessary for functioning of a community, such as water, power lines, transportation, or communication systems. Any act or practice that causes a real-time Critical Infrastructure System to impair its normal function and performance will have debilitating impact on security and economy, with direct implication on the society. SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) system is a control system which is widely used in Critical Infrastructure System to monitor and control industrial processes autonomously. As SCADA architecture relies on computers, networks, applications and programmable controllers, it is more vulnerable to security threats/attacks. Traditional SCADA communication protocols such as IEC 60870, DNP3, IEC 61850, or Modbus did not provide any security services. Newer standards such as IEC 62351 and AGA-12 offer security features to handle the attacks on SCADA system. However there are performance issues with the cryptographic solutions of these specifications when applied to SCADA systems. This research is aimed at improving the performance of SCADA security standards by employing NTRU, a faster and light-weight NTRU public key algorithm for providing end-to-end security.