Biblio
In recent years the use of wireless ad hoc networks has seen an increase of applications. A big part of the research has focused on Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MAnETs), due to its implementations in vehicular networks, battlefield communications, among others. These peer-to-peer networks usually test novel communications protocols, but leave out the network security part. A wide range of attacks can happen as in wired networks, some of them being more damaging in MANETs. Because of the characteristics of these networks, conventional methods for detection of attack traffic are ineffective. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are constructed on various detection techniques, but one of the most important is anomaly detection. IDSs based only in past attacks signatures are less effective, even more if these IDSs are centralized. Our work focuses on adding a novel Machine Learning technique to the detection engine, which recognizes attack traffic in an online way (not to store and analyze after), re-writing IDS rules on the fly. Experiments were done using the Dockemu emulation tool with Linux Containers, IPv6 and OLSR as routing protocol, leading to promising results.
The evolution of information and communication technologies has brought new challenges in managing the Internet. Software-Defined Networking (SDN) aims to provide easily configured and remotely controlled networks based on centralized control. Since SDN will be the next disruption in networking, SDN security has become a hot research topic because of its importance in communication systems. A centralized controller can become a focal point of attack, thus preventing attack in controller will be a priority. The whole network will be affected if attacker gain access to the controller. One of the attacks that affect SDN controller is DDoS attacks. This paper reviews different detection techniques that are available to prevent DDoS attacks, characteristics of these techniques and issues that may arise using these techniques.
Malicious hardware is a realistic threat. It can be possible to insert the malicious functionality on a device as deep as in the hardware design flow, long before manufacturing the silicon product. Towards developing a hardware Trojan horse detection methodology, we analyze capabilities and limitations of existing techniques, framing a testing strategy for uncovering efficiently hardware Trojan horses in mass-produced integrated circuits.