Biblio

Today's rapid progress in the physical implementation of quantum computers demands scalable synthesis methods to map practical logic designs to quantum architectures. There exist many quantum algorithms which use classical functions with superposition of states. Motivated by recent trends, in this paper, we show the design of quantum circuit to perform modular exponentiation functions using two different approaches. In the design phase, first we generate quantum circuit from a verilog implementation of exponentiation functions using synthesis tools and then apply two different Quantum Error Correction techniques. Finally the circuit is further optimized using the Linear Nearest Neighbor (LNN) Property. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by generating a set of networks for the reversible modular exponentiation function for a set of input values. At the end of the work, we have summarized the obtained results, where a cost analysis over our developed approaches has been made. Experimental results show that depending on the choice of different QECC methods the performance figures can vary by up to 11%, 10%, 8% in T-count, number of qubits, number of gates respectively.

Network-on-Chip (NoC) architecture is the communication heart of the processing cores in Multiprocessors System-on-Chip (MPSoC), where messages are routed from a source to a destination through intermediate nodes. Therefore, NoC has become a target to security attacks. By experiencing outsourcing design, NoC can be infected with a malicious Hardware Trojans (HTs) which potentially degrade the system performance or leave a backdoor for secret key leaking. In this paper, we propose a HT model that applies a denial of service attack by misrouting the packets, which causes deadlock and consequently degrading the NoC performance. We present a secure routing algorithm that provides a runtime HT detection and avoiding scheme. Results show that our proposed model has negligible overhead in area and power, 0.4% and 0.6%, respectively.

A hardware Trojan (HT) denotes the malicious addition or modification of circuit elements. The purpose of this work is to improve the HT detection sensitivity in ICs using power side-channel analysis. This paper presents three detection techniques in power based side-channel analysis by increasing Trojan-to-circuit power consumption and reducing the variation effect in the detection threshold. Incorporating the three proposed methods has demonstrated that a realistic fine-grain circuit partitioning and an improved pattern set to increase HT activation chances can magnify Trojan detectability.

Hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms may leak information through numerous side channels, which can be used to reveal the secret cryptographic keys, and therefore compromise the security of the algorithm. Power Analysis Attacks (PAAs) [1] exploit the information leakage from the device's power consumption (typically measured on the supply and/or ground pins). Digital circuits consume dynamic switching energy when data propagate through the logic in each new calculation (e.g. new clock cycle). The average power dissipation of a design can be expressed by: Ptot(t) = α · (Pd(t) + Ppvt(t)) (1) where α is the activity factor (the probability that the gate will switch) and depends on the probability distribution of the inputs to the combinatorial logic. This induces a linear relationship between the power and the processed data [2]. Pd is the deterministic power dissipated by the switching of the gate, including any parasitic and intrinsic capacitances, and hence can be evaluated prior to manufacturing. Ppvt is the change in expected power consumption due to nondeterministic parameters such as process variations, mismatch, temperature, etc. In this manuscript, we describe the design of logic gates that induce data-independent (constant) α and Pd.

This paper provides a proof-of-concept demonstration of the potential benefit of using logical implications for detection of combinational hardware trojans. Using logic simulation, valid logic implications are selected and added to to the checker circuitry to detect payload delivery by a combinational hardware trojan. Using combinational circuits from the ISCAS benchmark suite, and a modest hardware budget for the checker, simulation results show that the probability of a trojan escaping detection using our approach was only 16%.

This paper proposed a feedback shift register structure which can be split, it is based on a research of operating characteristics about 70 kinds of cryptographic algorithms and the research shows that the “different operations similar structure” reconfigurable design is feasible. Under the configuration information, the proposed structure can implement the multiplication in finite field GF(2n), the multiply/divide linear feedback shift register and other operations. Finally, this paper did a logic synthesis based on 55nm CMOS standard-cell library and the results show that the proposed structure gets a hardware resource saving of nearly 32%, the average power consumption saving of nearly 55% without the critical delay increasing significantly. Therefore, the “different operations similar structure” reconfigurable design is a new design method and the proposed feedback shift register structure can be an important processing unit for coarse-grained reconfigurable cryptologic array.

Reversible circuits are vulnerable to intellectual property and integrated circuit piracy. To show these vulnerabilities, a detailed understanding on how to identify the function embedded in a reversible circuit is crucial. To obtain the embedded function, one needs to know the synthesis approach used to generate the reversible circuit in the first place. We present a machine learning based scheme to identify the synthesis approach using telltale signs in the design.

Multi-state logic presents a promising avenue for more-than-Moore scaling, since efficient implementation of multi-valued logic (MVL) can significantly reduce switching and interconnection requirements and result in significant benefits compared to binary CMOS. So far, traditional approaches lag behind binary CMOS due to: (a) reliance on logic decomposition approaches [4][5][6] that result in many multi-valued minterms [4], complex polynomials [5], and decision diagrams [6], which are difficult to implement, and (b) emulation of multi-valued computation and communication through binary switches and medium that require data conversion, and large circuits. In this paper, we propose a fundamentally different approach for MVL decomposition, merging concepts from data science and nanoelectronics to tackle the problems, (a) First, we do linear regression on all inputs and outputs of a multivalued function, and find an expression that fits most input and output combinations. For unmatched combinations, we do successive regressions to find linear expressions. Next, using our novel visual pattern matching technique, we find conditions based on input and output conditions to select each expression. These expressions along with associated selection criteria ensure that for all possible inputs of a specific function, correct output can be reached. Our selection of regression model to find linear expressions, coefficients and conditions allow efficient hardware implementation. We discuss an approach for solving problem (b) and show an example of quaternary sum circuit. Our estimates show 65.6% saving of switching components compared with a 4-bit CMOS adder.

The detectability of malicious circuitry on FPGAs with varying placement properties yet has to be investigated. The authors utilize a Xilinx Virtex-II Pro target platform in order to insert a sequential denial-of-service Trojan into an existing AES design by manipulating a Xilinx-specific, intermediate file format prior to the bitstream generation. Thereby, there is no need for an attacker to acquire access to the hardware description language representation of a potential target architecture. Using a side-channel analysis setup for electromagnetic emanation (EM) measurements, they evaluate the detectability of different Trojan designs with varying location and logic distribution properties. The authors successfully distinguish the malicious from the genuine designs and provide information on how the location and distribution properties of the Trojan logic affect its detectability. To the best of their knowledge, this has been the first practically conducted Trojan detection using localized EM measurements.