Biblio

Filters: Author is Karame, Ghassan O.  [Clear All Filters]
2018-01-23
Li, Wenting, Sforzin, Alessandro, Fedorov, Sergey, Karame, Ghassan O..  2017.  Towards Scalable and Private Industrial Blockchains. Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Blockchain, Cryptocurrencies and Contracts. :9–14.

The blockchain emerges as an innovative tool that has the potential to positively impact the way we design a number of online applications today. In many ways, the blockchain technology is, however, still not mature enough to cater for industrial standards. Namely, existing Byzantine tolerant permission-based blockchain deployments can only scale to a limited number of nodes. These systems typically require that all transactions (and their order of execution) are publicly available to all nodes in the system, which comes at odds with common data sharing practices in the industry, and prevents a centralized regulator from overseeing the full blockchain system. In this paper, we propose a novel blockchain architecture devised specifically to meet industrial standards. Our proposal leverages the notion of satellite chains that can privately run different consensus protocols in parallel - thereby considerably boosting the scalability premises of the system. Our solution also accounts for a hands-off regulator that oversees the entire network, enforces specific policies by means of smart contracts, etc. We implemented our solution and integrated it with Hyperledger Fabric v0.6.

2017-11-03
Gervais, Arthur, Karame, Ghassan O., Wüst, Karl, Glykantzis, Vasileios, Ritzdorf, Hubert, Capkun, Srdjan.  2016.  On the Security and Performance of Proof of Work Blockchains. Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :3–16.
Proof of Work (PoW) powered blockchains currently account for more than 90% of the total market capitalization of existing digital cryptocurrencies. Although the security provisions of Bitcoin have been thoroughly analysed, the security guarantees of variant (forked) PoW blockchains (which were instantiated with different parameters) have not received much attention in the literature. This opens the question whether existing security analysis of Bitcoin's PoW applies to other implementations which have been instantiated with different consensus and/or network parameters. In this paper, we introduce a novel quantitative framework to analyse the security and performance implications of various consensus and network parameters of PoW blockchains. Based on our framework, we devise optimal adversarial strategies for double-spending and selfish mining while taking into account real world constraints such as network propagation, different block sizes, block generation intervals, information propagation mechanism, and the impact of eclipse attacks. Our framework therefore allows us to capture existing PoW-based deployments as well as PoW blockchain variants that are instantiated with different parameters, and to objectively compare the tradeoffs between their performance and security provisions.