Biblio

Filters: Author is Bindschaedler, Vincent  [Clear All Filters]
2018-01-16
Bindschaedler, Vincent, Rane, Shantanu, Brito, Alejandro E., Rao, Vanishree, Uzun, Ersin.  2017.  Achieving Differential Privacy in Secure Multiparty Data Aggregation Protocols on Star Networks. Proceedings of the Seventh ACM on Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy. :115–125.

We consider the problem of privacy-preserving data aggregation in a star network topology, i.e., several untrusting participants connected to a single aggregator. We require that the participants do not discover each other's data, and the service provider remains oblivious to each participant's individual contribution. Furthermore, the final result is to be published in a differentially private manner, i.e., the result should not reveal the contribution of any single participant to a (possibly external) adversary who knows the contributions of all other participants. In other words, we require a secure multiparty computation protocol that also incorporates a differentially private mechanism. Previous solutions have resorted to caveats such as postulating a trusted dealer to distribute keys to the participants, or introducing additional entities to withhold the decryption key from the aggregator, or relaxing the star topology by allowing pairwise communication amongst the participants. In this paper, we show how to obtain a noisy (differentially private) aggregation result using Shamir secret sharing and additively homomorphic encryption without these mitigating assumptions. More importantly, while we assume semi-honest participants, we allow the aggregator to be stronger than semi-honest, specifically in the sense that he can try to reduce the noise in the differentially private result. To respect the differential privacy requirement, collusions of mutually untrusting entities need to be analyzed differently from traditional secure multiparty computation: It is not sufficient that such collusions do not reveal the data of honest participants; we must also ensure that the colluding entities cannot undermine differential privacy by reducing the amount of noise in the final result. Our protocols avoid this by requiring that no entity – neither the aggregator nor any participant – knows how much noise a participant contributes to the final result. We also ensure that if a cheating aggregator tries to influence the noise term in the differentially private output, he can be detected with overwhelming probability.

2018-04-11
Wang, Wenhao, Chen, Guoxing, Pan, Xiaorui, Zhang, Yinqian, Wang, XiaoFeng, Bindschaedler, Vincent, Tang, Haixu, Gunter, Carl A..  2017.  Leaky Cauldron on the Dark Land: Understanding Memory Side-Channel Hazards in SGX. Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :2421–2434.

Side-channel risks of Intel SGX have recently attracted great attention. Under the spotlight is the newly discovered page-fault attack, in which an OS-level adversary induces page faults to observe the page-level access patterns of a protected process running in an SGX enclave. With almost all proposed defense focusing on this attack, little is known about whether such efforts indeed raise the bar for the adversary, whether a simple variation of the attack renders all protection ineffective, not to mention an in-depth understanding of other attack surfaces in the SGX system. In the paper, we report the first step toward systematic analyses of side-channel threats that SGX faces, focusing on the risks associated with its memory management. Our research identifies 8 potential attack vectors, ranging from TLB to DRAM modules. More importantly, we highlight the common misunderstandings about SGX memory side channels, demonstrating that high frequent AEXs can be avoided when recovering EdDSA secret key through a new page channel and fine-grained monitoring of enclave programs (at the level of 64B) can be done through combining both cache and cross-enclave DRAM channels. Our findings reveal the gap between the ongoing security research on SGX and its side-channel weaknesses, redefine the side-channel threat model for secure enclaves, and can provoke a discussion on when to use such a system and how to use it securely.