Biblio

Filters: Author is Schneider, Gerardo  [Clear All Filters]
2020-11-02
Pinisetty, Srinivas, Schneider, Gerardo, Sands, David.  2018.  Runtime Verification of Hyperproperties for Deterministic Programs. 2018 IEEE/ACM 6th International FME Workshop on Formal Methods in Software Engineering (FormaliSE). :20—29.
In this paper, we consider the runtime verification problem of safety hyperproperties for deterministic programs. Several security and information-flow policies such as data minimality, non-interference, integrity, and software doping are naturally expressed formally as safety hyperproperties. Although there are monitoring results for hyperproperties, the algorithms are very complex since these are properties over set of traces, and not over single traces. For the deterministic input-output programs that we consider, and the specific safety hyperproperties we are interested in, the problem can be reduced to monitoring of trace properties. In this paper, we present a simpler monitoring approach for safety hyperproperties of deterministic programs. The approach involves transforming the given safety hyperproperty into a trace property, extracting a characteristic predicate for the given hyperproperty, and providing a parametric monitor taking such predicate as parameter. For any hyperproperty in the considered subclass, we show how runtime verification monitors can be synthesised. We have implemented our approach in the form of a parameterised monitor for the given class, and have applied it to a number of hyperproperties including data minimisation, non-interference, integrity and software doping. We show results concerning both offline and online monitoring.
2018-06-11
Antignac, Thibaud, Mukelabai, Mukelabai, Schneider, Gerardo.  2017.  Specification, Design, and Verification of an Accountability-aware Surveillance Protocol. Proceedings of the Symposium on Applied Computing. :1372–1378.

Though controversial, surveillance activities are more and more performed for security reasons. However, such activities are extremely privacy-intrusive. This is seen as a necessary side-effect to ensure the success of such operations. In this paper, we propose an accountability-aware protocol designed for surveillance purposes. It relies on a strong incentive for a surveillance organisation to register its activity to a data protection authority. We first elicit a list of account-ability requirements, we provide an architecture showing the interaction of the different involved parties, and we propose an accountability-aware protocol which is formally specified in the applied pi calculus. We use the ProVerif tool to automatically verify that the protocol respects confidentiality, integrity and authentication properties.