Biblio

For a class of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs), we address the problem of performing computations over the cloud without revealing private information about the structure and operation of the system. We model CPSs as a collection of input-output dynamical systems (the system operation modes). Depending on the mode the system is operating on, the output trajectory is generated by one of these systems in response to driving inputs. Output measurements and driving inputs are sent to the cloud for processing purposes. We capture this "processing" through some function (of the input-output trajectory) that we require the cloud to compute accurately - referred here as the trajectory utility. However, for privacy reasons, we would like to keep the mode private, i.e., we do not want the cloud to correctly identify what mode of the CPS produced a given trajectory. To this end, we distort trajectories before transmission and send the corrupted data to the cloud. We provide mathematical tools (based on output-regulation techniques) to properly design distorting mechanisms so that: 1) the original and distorted trajectories lead to the same utility; and the distorted data leads the cloud to misclassify the mode.

An attack detection scheme is proposed to detect data integrity attacks on sensors in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs). A combined fingerprint for sensor and process noise is created during the normal operation of the system. Under sensor spoofing attack, noise pattern deviates from the fingerprinted pattern enabling the proposed scheme to detect attacks. To extract the noise (difference between expected and observed value) a representative model of the system is derived. A Kalman filter is used for the purpose of state estimation. By subtracting the state estimates from the real system states, a residual vector is obtained. It is shown that in steady state the residual vector is a function of process and sensor noise. A set of time domain and frequency domain features is extracted from the residual vector. Feature set is provided to a machine learning algorithm to identify the sensor and process. Experiments are performed on two testbeds, a real-world water treatment (SWaT) facility and a water distribution (WADI) testbed. A class of zero-alarm attacks, designed for statistical detectors on SWaT are detected by the proposed scheme. It is shown that a multitude of sensors can be uniquely identified with accuracy higher than 90% based on the noise fingerprint.