Biblio
Unlike traditional processors, Internet of Things (IoT) devices are short of resources to incorporate mature protections (e.g. MMU, TrustZone) against modern control-flow attacks. Remote (control-flow) attestation is fast becoming a key instrument in securing such devices as it has proven the effectiveness on not only detecting runtime malware infestation of a remote device, but also saving the computing resources by moving the costly verification process away. However, few control-flow attestation schemes have been able to draw on any systematic research into the software specificity of bare-metal systems, which are widely deployed on resource-constrained IoT devices. To our knowledge, the unique design patterns of the system limit implementations of such expositions. In this paper, we present the design and proof-of-concept implementation of LAPE, a lightweight attestation of program execution scheme that enables detecting control-flow attacks for bare-metal systems without requiring hardware modification. With rudimentary memory protection support found in modern IoT-class microcontrollers, LAPE leverages software instrumentation to compartmentalize the firmware functions into several ”attestation compartments”. It then continuously tracks the control-flow events of each compartment and periodically reports them to the verifier. The PoC of the scheme is incorporated into an LLVM-based compiler to generate the LAPE-enabled firmware. By taking experiments with several real-world IoT firmware, the results show both the efficiency and practicality of LAPE.
In order to improve the information security level of intelligent substation, this paper proposes an intelligent substation information security assessment tool through the research and analysis of intelligent substation information security risk and information security assessment method, and proves that the tool can effectively detect it. It is of great significance to carry out research on industrial control systems, especially intelligent substation information security.
Aiming at the operation characteristics of power industry control system, this paper deeply analyses the attack mechanism and characteristics of power industry control system intrusion. On the basis of classifying and sorting out the attack characteristics of power industrial control system, this paper also attaches importance to break the basic theory and consequential technologies of industrial control network space security, and constructs the network intrusion as well as attack model of power industrial control system to realize the precise characterization of attackers' attack behavior, which provides a theoretical model for the analysis and early warning of attack behavior analysis of power industrial control systems.