Biblio

The applications in the critical infrastructure systems pose simultaneous resilience and performance requirements to the underlying computer network. To meet such requirements, the networks that use the store-and-forward paradigm poses stringent conditions on the redundancy in the network topology and results in problems that becoming computationally challenging to solve at scale. However, with the advent of programmable data-planes, it is now possible to use linear network coding (NC) at the intermediate network nodes to meet resilience requirements of the applications. To that end, we propose an architecture that realizes linear NC in programmable networks by decomposing the linear NC functions into the atomic coding primitives. We designed and implemented the primitives using the features offered by the P4 ecosystem. Using an empirical evaluation, we show that the theoretical gains promised by linear network coding can be realized with a per-packet processing cost.

Attack graphs used in network security analysis are analyzed to determine sequences of exploits that lead to successful acquisition of privileges or data at critical assets. An attack graph edge corresponds to a vulnerability, tacitly assuming a connection exists and tacitly assuming the vulnerability is known to exist. In this paper we explore use of uncertain graphs to extend the paradigm to include lack of certainty in connection and/or existence of a vulnerability. We extend the standard notion of uncertain graph (where the existence of each edge is probabilistically independent) however, as significant correlations on edge existence probabilities exist in practice, owing to common underlying causes for dis-connectivity and/or presence of vulnerabilities. Our extension describes each edge probability as a Boolean expression of independent indicator random variables. This paper (i) shows that this formalism is maximally descriptive in the sense that it can describe any joint probability distribution function of edge existence, (ii) shows that when these Boolean expressions are monotone then we can easily perform uncertainty analysis of edge probabilities, and (iii) uses these results to model a partial attack graph of the Stuxnet worm and a small enterprise network and to answer important security-related questions in a probabilistic manner.