Biblio

The accelerated move toward adopting the Smart Grid paradigm has resulted in numerous drawbacks as far as security is concerned. Traditional power grids are becoming more vulnerable to cyberattacks as all the control decisions are generated based on the data the Smart Grid generates during its operation. This data can be tampered with or attacked in communication lines to mislead the control room in decision-making. The false data injection attack (FDIA) is one of the most severe cyberattacks on today’s cyber-physical power system, as it has the potential to cause significant physical and financial damage. However, detecting cyberattacks are incredibly challenging since they have no known patterns. In this paper, we launch a random FDIA on IEEE-39 bus system. Later, we propose a Bagging MLP-based autoencoder to detect the FDIAs in the power system and compare the result with a single ML model. The Bagging MLP-based autoencoder outperforms the Isolation forest while detecting FDIAs.

Critical infrastructures such as the electricity grid can be severely impacted by cyber-attacks on its supply chain. Hence, having a robust cybersecurity infrastructure and management system for the electricity grid is a high priority. This paper proposes a cyber-security protocol for defense against man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attacks to the supply chain, which uses encryption and cryptographic multi-party authentication. A cyber-physical simulator is utilized to simulate the power system, control system, and security layers. The correctness of the attack modeling and the cryptographic security protocol against this MiTM attack is demonstrated in four different attack scenarios.

Supply chain cyberattacks that exploit insecure third-party software are a growing concern for the security of the electric power grid. These attacks seek to deploy malicious software in grid control devices during the fabrication, shipment, installation, and maintenance stages, or as part of routine software updates. Malicious software on grid control devices may inject bad data or execute bad commands, which can cause blackouts and damage power equipment. This paper describes an experimental setup to simulate the software update process of a commercial power relay as part of a hardware-in-the-loop simulation for grid supply chain cyber-security assessment. The laboratory setup was successfully utilized to study three supply chain cyber-security use cases.

Due to the increasing number of heterogeneous devices connected to electric power grid, the attack surface increases the threat actors. Game theory and machine learning are being used to study the power system failures caused by external manipulation. Most of existing works in the literature focus on one-shot process of attacks and fail to show the dynamic evolution of the defense strategy. In this paper, we focus on an adversarial multistage sequential game between the adversaries of the smart electric power transmission and distribution system. We study the impact of exploration rate and convergence of the attack strategies (sequences of action that creates large scale blackout based on the system capacity) based on the reinforcement learning approach. We also illustrate how the learned attack actions disrupt the normal operation of the grid by creating transmission line outages, bus voltage violations, and generation loss. This simulation studies are conducted on IEEE 9 and 39 bus systems. The results show the improvement of the defense strategy through the learning process. The results also prove the feasibility of the learned attack actions by replicating the disturbances created in simulated power system.

Traditional power grid security schemes are being replaced by highly advanced and efficient smart security schemes due to the advancement in grid structure and inclusion of cyber control and monitoring tools. Smart attackers create physical, cyber, or cyber-physical attacks to gain the access of the power system and manipulate/override system status, measurements and commands. In this paper, we formulate the environment for the attacker-defender interaction in the smart power grid. We provide a strategic analysis of the attacker-defender strategic interaction using a game theoretic approach. We apply repeated game to formulate the problem, implement it in the power system, and investigate for optimal strategic behavior in terms of mixed strategies of the players. In order to define the utility or cost function for the game payoffs calculation, generation power is used. Attack-defense budget is also incorporated with the attacker-defender repeated game to reflect a more realistic scenario. The proposed game model is validated using IEEE 39 bus benchmark system. A comparison between the proposed game model and the all monitoring model is provided to validate the observations.