Biblio

Filters: Author is Winslett, Marianne  [Clear All Filters]
2022-09-20
Yan, Weili, Lou, Xin, Yau, David K.Y., Yang, Ying, Saifuddin, Muhammad Ramadan, Wu, Jiyan, Winslett, Marianne.  2021.  A Stealthier False Data Injection Attack against the Power Grid. 2021 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids (SmartGridComm). :108—114.
We use discrete-time adaptive control theory to design a novel false data injection (FDI) attack against automatic generation control (AGC), a critical system that maintains a power grid at its requisite frequency. FDI attacks can cause equipment damage or blackouts by falsifying measurements in the streaming sensor data used to monitor the grid's operation. Compared to prior work, the proposed attack (i) requires less knowledge on the part of the attacker, such as correctly forecasting the future demand for power; (ii) is stealthier in its ability to bypass standard methods for detecting bad sensor data and to keep the false sensor readings near historical norms until the attack is well underway; and (iii) can sustain the frequency excursion as long as needed to cause real-world damage, in spite of AGC countermeasures. We validate the performance of the proposed attack on realistic 37-bus and 118-bus setups in PowerWorld, an industry-strength power system simulator trusted by real-world operators. The results demonstrate the attack's improved stealthiness and effectiveness compared to prior work.
2020-08-07
Lou, Xin, Tran, Cuong, Yau, David K.Y., Tan, Rui, Ng, Hongwei, Fu, Tom Zhengjia, Winslett, Marianne.  2019.  Learning-Based Time Delay Attack Characterization for Cyber-Physical Systems. 2019 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids (SmartGridComm). :1—6.
The cyber-physical systems (CPSes) rely on computing and control techniques to achieve system safety and reliability. However, recent attacks show that these techniques are vulnerable once the cyber-attackers have bypassed air gaps. The attacks may cause service disruptions or even physical damages. This paper designs the built-in attack characterization scheme for one general type of cyber-attacks in CPS, which we call time delay attack, that delays the transmission of the system control commands. We use the recurrent neural networks in deep learning to estimate the delay values from the input trace. Specifically, to deal with the long time-sequence data, we design the deep learning model using stacked bidirectional long short-term memory (LSTM) units. The proposed approach is tested by using the data generated from a power plant control system. The results show that the LSTM-based deep learning approach can work well based on data traces from three sensor measurements, i.e., temperature, pressure, and power generation, in the power plant control system. Moreover, we show that the proposed approach outperforms the base approach based on k-nearest neighbors.