Biblio

Zigbee network security relies on symmetric cryptography based on a pre-shared secret. In the current Zigbee protocol, the network coordinator creates a network key while establishing a network. The coordinator then shares the network key securely, encrypted under the pre-shared secret, with devices joining the network to ensure the security of future communications among devices through the network key. The pre-shared secret, therefore, needs to be installed in millions or more devices prior to deployment, and thus will be inevitably leaked, enabling attackers to compromise the confidentiality and integrity of the network. To improve the security of Zigbee networks, we propose a new certificate-less Zigbee joining protocol that leverages low-cost public-key primitives. The new protocol has two components. The first is to integrate Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange into the existing association request/response messages, and to use this key both for link-to-link communication and for encryption of the network key to enhance privacy of user devices. The second is to improve the security of the installation code, a new joining method introduced in Zigbee 3.0 for enhanced security, by using public key encryption. We analyze the security of our proposed protocol using the formal verification methods provided by ProVerif, and evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of our solution with a prototype built with open source software and hardware stack. The new protocol does not introduce extra messages and the overhead is as lows as 3.8% on average for the join procedure.