Biblio

High-level C++ source code abstractions such as classes and methods greatly assist human analysts and automated algorithms alike when analyzing C++ programs. Unfortunately, these abstractions are lost when compiling C++ source code, which impedes the understanding of C++ executables. In this paper, we propose a system, OOAnalyzer, that uses an innovative new design to statically recover detailed C++ abstractions from executables in a scalable manner. OOAnalyzer's design is motivated by the observation that many human analysts reason about C++ programs by recognizing simple patterns in binary code and then combining these findings using logical inference, domain knowledge, and intuition. We codify this approach by combining a lightweight symbolic analysis with a flexible Prolog-based reasoning system. Unlike most existing work, OOAnalyzer is able to recover both polymorphic and non-polymorphic C++ classes. We show in our evaluation that OOAnalyzer assigns over 78% of methods to the correct class on our test corpus, which includes both malware and real-world software such as Firefox and MySQL. These recovered abstractions can help analysts understand the behavior of C++ malware and cleanware, and can also improve the precision of program analyses on C++ executables.

Security features are often hardwired into software applications, making it difficult to adapt security responses to reflect changes in runtime context and new attacks. In prior work, we proposed the idea of architecture-based self-protection as a way of separating adaptation logic from application logic and providing a global perspective for reasoning about security adaptations in the context of other business goals. In this paper, we present an approach, based on this idea, for combating denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Our approach allows DoS-related tactics to be composed into more sophisticated mitigation strategies that encapsulate possible responses to a security problem. Then, utility-based reasoning can be used to consider different business contexts and qualities. We describe how this approach forms the underpinnings of a scientific approach to self-protection, allowing us to reason about how to make the best choice of mitigation at runtime. Moreover, we also show how formal analysis can be used to determine whether the mitigations cover the range of conditions the system is likely to encounter, and the effect of mitigations on other quality attributes of the system. We evaluate the approach using the Rainbow self-adaptive framework and show how Rainbow chooses DoS mitigation tactics that are sensitive to different business contexts.