Biblio

Smartphone users often use private and enterprise data with untrusted third party applications.  The fundamental lack of secrecy guarantees in smartphone OSes, such as Android, exposes this data to the risk of unauthorized exfiltration.  A natural solution is the integration of secrecy guarantees into the OS.  In this paper, we describe the challenges for decentralized information flow control (DIFC) enforcement on Android.  We propose context-sensitive DIFC enforcement via lazy polyinstantiation and practical and secure network export through domain declassification.  Our DIFC system, Weir, is backwards compatible by design, and incurs less than 4 ms overhead for component startup.  With Weir,  we demonstrate practical and secure DIFC enforcement on Android.

Security isolation is a foundation of computing systems that enables resilience to different forms of attacks. This article seeks to understand existing security isolation techniques by systematically classifying different approaches and analyzing their properties. We provide a hierarchical classification structure for grouping different security  isolation techniques.  At the top level, we consider two principal aspects: mechanism and policy. Each aspect is broken down into salient dimensions that describe key properties. We break the mechanism into two dimensions: enforcement location and isolation granularity, and break the policy aspect  down into three dimensions: policy generation, policy configurability, and policy lifetime. We apply our classification to a set of representative papers that cover a breadth of security isolation techniques and discuss trade-offs among different design choices and limitations of existing  approaches.