Biblio

Control flow integrity (CFI) checks are used in desktop systems, in order to protect them from various forms of attacks, but they are rarely investigated for embedded systems, due to their introduced overhead. The contribution of this paper is an efficient software implementation of a CFI-check for ARM-and Xtensa processors. Moreover, we propose the combination of this CFI-check with another defense mechanism against return-oriented-programming (ROP). We show that by this combination the security is significantly improved. Moreover, it will also in-crease the safety of the system, since the combination can detect a failed ROP-attack and bring the system in a safe state, which is not possible when using each technique separately. We will also report on the introduced overhead in code size and run time.

This paper shows that the modern high customizable Xtensa architecture for embedded devices is exploitable by Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) attacks. We used a simple Hello-World application written with the RIOT OS as an almost minimal code basis for determining if the number of gadgets that can be found in this code base is sufficient to build a reasonably complex attack. We determined 859 found gadgets which are sufficient to create a gadget catalog for the Xtensa. Despite the code basis used being really small, the presented gadget catalog provides Turing completeness, which allows an arbitrary computation of any exploit program.

Code-reuse attacks pose a threat to embedded devices since they are able to defeat common security defenses such as non-executable stacks. To succeed in his code-reuse attack, the attacker has to gain knowledge of some or all of the instructions of the target firmware/software. In case of a bare-metal firmware that is protected from being dumped out of a device, it is hard to know the running instructions of the target firmware. This consequently makes code-reuse attacks more difficult to achieve. This paper shows how an attacker can gain knowledge of some of these instructions by sniffing the unencrypted incremental updates. These updates exist to reduce the radio reception power for resource-constrained devices. Based on the literature, these updates are checked against authentication and integrity, but they are sometimes sent unencrypted. Therefore, it will be demonstrated how a Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) attack can be accomplished using only the passively sniffed incremental updates. The generated updates of the R3diff and Delta Generator (DG) differencing algorithms will be under assessment. The evaluation reveals that both of them can be exploited by the attacker. It also shows that the DG generated updates leak more information than the R3diff generated updates. To defend against this attack, different countermeasures that consider different power consumption scenarios are proposed, but yet to be evaluated.

This paper shows how the Xtensa architecture can be attacked with Return-Oriented-Programming (ROP). The presented techniques include possibilities for both supported Application Binary Interfaces (ABIs). Especially for the windowed ABI a powerful mechanism is presented that not only allows to jump to gadgets but also to manipulate registers without relying on specific gadgets. This paper purely focuses on how the properties of the architecture itself can be exploited to chain gadgets and not on specific attacks or a gadget catalog.