Biblio

Filters: Author is Cao, Yinzhi  [Clear All Filters]
2022-03-22
Bai, Zhihao, Wang, Ke, Zhu, Hang, Cao, Yinzhi, Jin, Xin.  2021.  Runtime Recovery of Web Applications under Zero-Day ReDoS Attacks. 2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). :1575—1588.
Regular expression denial of service (ReDoS)— which exploits the super-linear running time of matching regular expressions against carefully crafted inputs—is an emerging class of DoS attacks to web services. One challenging question for a victim web service under ReDoS attacks is how to quickly recover its normal operation after ReDoS attacks, especially these zero-day ones exploiting previously unknown vulnerabilities.In this paper, we present RegexNet, the first payload-based, automated, reactive ReDoS recovery system for web services. RegexNet adopts a learning model, which is updated constantly in a feedback loop during runtime, to classify payloads of upcoming requests including the request contents and database query responses. If detected as a cause leading to ReDoS, RegexNet migrates those requests to a sandbox and isolates their execution for a fast, first-measure recovery.We have implemented a RegexNet prototype and integrated it with HAProxy and Node.js. Evaluation results show that RegexNet is effective in recovering the performance of web services against zero-day ReDoS attacks, responsive on reacting to attacks in sub-minute, and resilient to different ReDoS attack types including adaptive ones that are designed to evade RegexNet on purpose.
2021-06-01
Chen, Zhanhao, Cao, Yinzhi.  2020.  JSKernel: Fortifying JavaScript against Web Concurrency Attacks via a Kernel-Like Structure. 2020 50th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN). :64—75.
As portals to the Internet, web browsers constitute prominent targets for attacks. Existing defenses that redefine web APIs typically capture information related to a single JavaScript function. Thus, they fail to defend against the so-called web concurrency attacks that use multiple interleaved functions to trigger a browser vulnerability. In this paper, we propose JSKernel, the first generic framework that introduces a kernel concept into JavaScript to defend against web concurrency attacks. The JavaScript kernel, inspired from operating system concepts, enforces the execution order of JavaScript events and threads to fortify security. We implement a prototype of JSKernel deployable as add-on extensions to three widely used web browsers, namely Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, and Microsoft Edge. These open-source extensions are available at (https://github.com/jskernel2019/jskernel) along with a usability demo at (https://jskernel2019.github.io/). Our evaluation shows the prototype to be robust to web concurrency attacks, fast, and backward compatible with legacy websites.