Biblio

Filters: Author is Cao, Phuong  [Clear All Filters]
2017-07-24
Cao, Phuong, Badger, Eric C., Kalbarczyk, Zbigniew T., Iyer, Ravishankar K..  2016.  A Framework for Generation, Replay, and Analysis of Real-world Attack Variants. Proceedings of the Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security. :28–37.

This paper presents a framework for (1) generating variants of known attacks, (2) replaying attack variants in an isolated environment and, (3) validating detection capabilities of attack detection techniques against the variants. Our framework facilitates reproducible security experiments. We generated 648 variants of three real-world attacks (observed at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications at the University of Illinois). Our experiment showed the value of generating attack variants by quantifying the detection capabilities of three detection methods: a signature-based detection technique, an anomaly-based detection technique, and a probabilistic graphical model-based technique.

2014-09-17
Cao, Phuong, Li, Hongyang, Nahrstedt, Klara, Kalbarczyk, Zbigniew, Iyer, Ravishankar, Slagell, Adam J..  2014.  Personalized Password Guessing: A New Security Threat. Proceedings of the 2014 Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security. :22:1–22:2.

This paper presents a model for generating personalized passwords (i.e., passwords based on user and service profile). A user's password is generated from a list of personalized words, each word is drawn from a topic relating to a user and the service in use. The proposed model can be applied to: (i) assess the strength of a password (i.e., determine how many guesses are used to crack the password), and (ii) generate secure (i.e., contains digits, special characters, or capitalized characters) yet easy to memorize passwords.

Cao, Phuong, Chung, Key-whan, Kalbarczyk, Zbigniew, Iyer, Ravishankar, Slagell, Adam J..  2014.  Preemptive Intrusion Detection. Proceedings of the 2014 Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security. :21:1–21:2.

This paper presents a system named SPOT to achieve high accuracy and preemptive detection of attacks. We use security logs of real-incidents that occurred over a six-year period at National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) to evaluate SPOT. Our data consists of attacks that led directly to the target system being compromised, i.e., not detected in advance, either by the security analysts or by intrusion detection systems. Our approach can detect 75 percent of attacks as early as minutes to tens of hours before attack payloads are executed.