Biblio

Many applications are bandwidth consuming but may tolerate longer flow completion times. Multipath protocols, such as multipath TCP (MPTCP), can offer bandwidth aggregation and resilience to link failures for such applications, and low priority congestion control (LPCC) mechanisms can make these applications yield to other time-sensitive ones. Properly combining the above two can improve the overall user experience. However, the existing LPCC mechanisms are not adequate for MPTCP. They do not take into account the characteristics of multiple network paths, and cannot ensure fairness among the same priority flows. Therefore, we propose a multipath LPCC mechanism, i.e., Dynamic Coupled Low Extra Delay Background Transport, named DC-LEDBAT. Our scheme is designed based on a standardized LPCC mechanism LEDBAT. To avoid unfairness among the same priority flows, DC-LEDBAT trades little throughput for precisely measuring the minimum delay. Moreover, to be friendly to single-path LEDBAT, our scheme leverages the correlation of the queuing delay to detect whether multiple paths go through a shared bottleneck. Then, DC-LEDBAT couples the congestion window at shared bottlenecks to control the sending rate. We implement DC-LEDBAT in a Linux kernel and experimental results show that DC-LEDBAT can not only utilize the excess bandwidth of MPTCP but also ensure fairness among the same priority flows.

The whole Software-Defined Networking (SDN) system might be out of service when the control plane is overloaded by control plane saturation attacks. In this attack, a malicious host can manipulate massive table-miss packets to exhaust the control plane resources. Even though many studies have focused on this problem, systems still suffer from more influenced switches because of centralized mitigation policies, and long recovery delay because of the remaining attack flows. To solve these problems, we propose FSDM, a Fast recovery Saturation attack Detection and Mitigation framework. For detection, FSDM extracts the distribution of Control Channel Occupation Rate (CCOR) to detect the attack and locates the port that attackers come from. For mitigation, with the attacker's location and distributed Mitigation Agents, FSDM adopts different policies to migrate or block attack flows, which influences fewer switches and protects the control plane from resource exhaustion. Besides, to reduce the system recovery delay, FSDM equips a novel functional module called Force\_Checking, which enables the whole system to quickly clean up the remaining attack flows and recovery faster. Finally, we conducted extensive experiments, which show that, with the increasing of attack PPS (Packets Per Second), FSDM only suffers a minor recovery delay increase. Compared with traditional methods without cleaning up remaining flows, FSDM saves more than 81% of ping RTT under attack rate ranged from 1000 to 4000 PPS, and successfully reduced the delay of 87% of HTTP requests time under large attack rate ranged from 5000 to 30000 PPS.