Biblio

The deterministic nature of existing routing protocols has resulted into an ossified Internet with static and predictable network routes. This gives persistent attackers (e.g. eavesdroppers and DDoS attackers) plenty of time to study the network and identify the vulnerable (critical) links to plan devastating and stealthy attacks. Recently, Moving Target Defense (MTD) based approaches have been proposed to to defend against DoS attacks. However, MTD based approaches for route mutation are oriented towards re-configuring the parameters in Local Area Networks (LANs), and do not provide any protection against infrastructure level attacks, which inherently limits their use for mission critical services over the Internet infrastructure. To cope with these issues, we extend the current routing architecture to consider end-hosts as routing elements, and present a formal method based agile defense mechanism to embed resiliency in the existing cyber infrastructure. The major contributions of this paper include: (1) formalization of efficient and resilient End to End (E2E) reachability problem as a constraint satisfaction problem, which identifies the potential end-hosts to reach a destination while satisfying resilience and QoS constraints, (2) design and implementation of a novel decentralized End Point Route Mutation (EPRM) protocol, and (3) design and implementation of planning algorithm to minimize the overlap between multiple flows, for the sake of maximizing the agility in the system. Our PlanetLab based implementation and evaluation validates the correctness, effectiveness and scalability of the proposed approach.

The premise of the SafeConfig'16 Workshop is existing tools and methods for security assessments are necessary but insufficient for scientifically rigorous testing and evaluation of resilient and active cyber systems. The objective for this workshop is the exploration and discussion of scientifically sound testing regimen(s) that will continuously and dynamically probe, attack, and "test" the various resilient and active technologies. This adaptation and change in focus necessitates at the very least modification, and potentially, wholesale new developments to ensure that resilient- and agile-aware security testing is available to the research community. All testing, validation and experimentation must also be repeatable, reproducible, subject to scientific scrutiny, measurable and meaningful to both researchers and practitioners. The workshop will convene a panel of experts to explore this concept. The topic will be discussed from three different perspectives. One perspective is that of the practitioner. We will explore whether active and resilient technologies are or are planned for deployment and whether the verification methodology affects that decision. The second perspective will be that of the research community. We will address the shortcomings of current approaches and the research directions needed to address the practitioner's concerns. The third perspective is that of the policy community. Specifically, we will explore the dynamics between technology, verification, and policy.