Biblio

The security of critical infrastructures such as oil and gas cyber-physical systems is a significant concern in today's world where malicious activities are frequent like never before. On one side we have cyber criminals who compromise cyber infrastructure to control physical processes; we also have physical criminals who attack the physical infrastructure motivated to destroy the target or to steal oil from pipelines. Unfortunately, due to limited resources and physical dispersion, it is impossible for the system administrator to protect each target all the time. In this research paper, we tackle the problem of cyber and physical attacks on oil pipeline infrastructure by proposing a Stackelberg Security Game of three players: system administrator as a leader, cyber and physical attackers as followers. The novelty of this paper is that we have formulated a real world problem of oil stealing using a game theoretic approach. The game has two different types of targets attacked by two distinct types of adversaries with different motives and who can coordinate to maximize their rewards. The solution to this game assists the system administrator of the oil pipeline cyber-physical system to allocate the cyber security controls for the cyber targets and to assign patrol teams to the pipeline regions efficiently. This paper provides a theoretical framework for formulating and solving the above problem.

In this research paper, we present a function-based methodology to evaluate the resilience of gas pipeline systems under two different cyber-physical attack scenarios. The first attack scenario is the pressure integrity attack on the natural gas high-pressure transmission pipeline. Through simulations, we have analyzed the cyber attacks that propagate from cyber to the gas pipeline physical domain, the time before which the SCADA system should respond to such attacks, and finally, an attack which prevents the response of the system. We have used the combined results of simulations of a wireless mesh network for remote terminal units and of a gas pipeline simulation to measure the shortest Time to Criticality (TTC) parameter; the time for an event to reach the failure state. The second attack scenario describes how a failure of a cyber node controlling power grid functionality propagates from cyber to power to gas pipeline systems. We formulate this problem using a graph-theoretic approach and quantify the resilience of the networks by percentage of connected nodes and the length of the shortest path between them. The results show that parameters such as TTC, power distribution capacity of the power grid nodes and percentage of the type of cyber nodes compromised, regulate the efficiency and resilience of the power and gas networks. The analysis of such attack scenarios helps the gas pipeline system administrators design attack remediation algorithms and improve the response of the system to an attack.