Biblio

Memory corruption attacks have existed for multiple decades, and have become a major threat to computer systems. At the same time, a number of defense techniques have been proposed by research community. With the wide adoption of CPU-based memory safety solutions, sophisticated attackers tend to tamper with system memory via direct memory access (DMA) attackers, which leverage DMA-enabled I/O peripherals to fully compromise system memory. The Input-Output Memory Management Units (IOMMUs) based solutions are widely believed to mitigate DMA attacks. However, recent works point out that attackers can bypass IOMMU-based protections by manipulating the DMA interfaces, which are particularly vulnerable to race conditions and other unsafe interactions.State-of-the-art hardware-supported memory protections rely on metadata to perform security checks on memory access. Consequently, the additional memory request for metadata results in significant performance degradation, which limited their feasibility in real world deployments. For quantitative analysis, we separate the total metadata access latency into DRAM latency, on-chip latency, and cache latency, and observe that the actual DRAM access is less than half of the total latency. To minimize metadata access latency, we propose EMC, a low-overhead heap memory safety solution that implements a tripwire based mechanism on the memory controller. In addition, by using memory controller as a natural gateway of various memory access data paths, EMC could provide comprehensive memory safety enforcement to all memory data paths from/to system physical memory. Our evaluation shows an 0.54% performance overhead on average for SPEC 2017 workloads.