Biblio

In the ASPIRE research project, a software protection tool flow was designed and prototyped that targets native ARM Android code. This tool flow supports the deployment of a number of protections against man-at-the-end attacks. In this tutorial, an overview of the tool flow will be presented and attendants will participate to a hands-on demonstration. In addition, we will present an overview of the decision support systems developed in the project to facilitate the use of the protection tool flow.

Existing anti-debugging protections are relatively weak. In existing self-debugger approaches, a custom debugger is attached to the main application, of which the control flow is obfuscated by redirecting it through the debugger. The coupling between the debugger and the main application is then quite loose, and not that hard to break by an attacker. In the tightly-coupled self-debugging technique proposed in this paper, full code fragments are migrated from the application to the debugger, making it harder for the attacker to reverse-engineer the program and to deconstruct it into the original unprotected program to attach a debugger or to collect traces. We evaluate a prototype implementation on three complex, real-world Android use cases and present the results of tests conducted by professional penetration testers.

This paper describes the ASPIRE reference architecture designed to tackle one major problem in this domain: the lack of a clear process and an open software architecture for the composition and deployment of multiple software protections on software applications.
 

This paper describes the ASPIRE reference architecture designed to tackle one major problem in this domain: the lack of a clear process and an open software architecture for the composition and deployment of multiple software protections on software applications.