Biblio

One of the most difficult challenges in robot motion planning is to account for the behavior of other moving agents, such as humans. Commonly, practitioners employ predictive models to reason about where other agents are going to move. Though there has been much recent work in building predictive models, no model is ever perfect: an agent can always move unexpectedly, in a way that is not predicted or not assigned sufficient probability. In such cases, the robot may plan trajectories that appear safe but, in fact, lead to collision. Rather than trust a model’s predictions blindly, we propose that the robot should use the model’s current predictive accuracy to inform the degree of confidence in its future predictions. This model confidence inference allows us to generate probabilistic motion predictions that exploit modeled structure when the structure successfully explains human motion, and degrade gracefully whenever the human moves unexpectedly. We accomplish this by maintaining a Bayesian belief over a single parameter that governs the variance of our human motion model. We couple this prediction algorithm with a recently proposed robust motion planner and controller to guide the construction of robot trajectories that are, to a good approximation, collision-free with a high, user-specified probability. We provide extensive analysis of the combined approach and its overall safety properties by establishing a connection to reachability analysis, and conclude with a hardware demonstration in which a small quadcopter operates safely in the same space as a human pedestrian.

The theory of robust control models the controller-disturbance interaction as a game where disturbance is nonstrategic. The proviso of a deliberately malicious (strategic) attacker should be considered to increase the robustness of infrastructure systems. This has become especially important since many IT systems supporting critical functionalities are vulnerable to exploits by attackers. While the usefulness of game theory methods for modeling cyber-security is well established in the literature, new game theoretic models of cyber-physical security are needed for deriving useful insights on "optimal" attack plans and defender responses, both in terms of allocation of resources and operational strategies of these players. This whitepaper presents some progress and challenges in using game-theoretic models for security of infrastructure networks. Main insights from the following models are presented: (i) Network security game on flow networks under strategic edge disruptions; (ii) Interdiction problem on distribution networks under node disruptions; (iii) Inspection game to monitor commercial non-technical losses (e.g. energy diversion); and (iv) Interdependent security game of networked control systems under communication failures. These models can be used to analyze the attacker-defender interactions in a class of cyber-physical security scenarios.