Biblio
Brute-force login attempts are common for every host on the public Internet. While most of them can be discarded as low-threat attacks, targeted attack campaigns often use a dictionary-based brute-force attack to establish a foothold in the network. Therefore, it is important to characterize the attackers' behavior to prioritize defensive measures and react to new threats quickly. In this paper we present a set of metrics that can support threat hunters in characterizing brute-force login attempts. Based on connection metadata, timing information, and the attacker's dictionary these metrics can help to differentiate scans and to find common behavior across distinct IP addresses. We evaluated our novel metrics on a real-world data set of malicious login attempts collected by our honeypot Honeygrove. We highlight interesting metrics, show how clustering can be leveraged to reveal common behavior across IP addresses, and describe how selected metrics help to assess the threat level of attackers. Amongst others, we for example found strong indicators for collusion between ten otherwise unrelated IP addresses confirming that a clustering of the right metrics can help to reveal coordinated attacks.
Cybercrime is growing dramatically in the technological world nowadays. World Wide Web criminals exploit the personal information of internet users and use them to their advantage. Unethical users leverage the dark web to buy and sell illegal products or services and sometimes they manage to gain access to classified government information. A number of illegal activities that can be found in the dark web include selling or buying hacking tools, stolen data, digital fraud, terrorists activities, drugs, weapons, and more. The aim of this project is to collect evidence of any malicious activity in the dark web by using computer security mechanisms as traps called honeypots.
In recent years, persistent cyber adversaries have developed increasingly sophisticated techniques to evade detection. Once adversaries have established a foothold within the target network, using seemingly-limited passive reconnaissance techniques, they can develop significant network reconnaissance capabilities. Cyber deception has been recognized as a critical capability to defend against such adversaries, but, without an accurate model of the adversary's reconnaissance behavior, current approaches are ineffective against advanced adversaries. To address this gap, we propose a novel model to capture how advanced, stealthy adversaries acquire knowledge about the target network and establish and expand their foothold within the system. This model quantifies the cost and reward, from the adversary's perspective, of compromising and maintaining control over target nodes. We evaluate our model through simulations in the CyberVAN testbed, and indicate how it can guide the development and deployment of future defensive capabilities, including high-interaction honeypots, so as to influence the behavior of adversaries and steer them away from critical resources.
We propose a novel attestation architecture for the Internet of Things (IoT). Our distributed attestation network (DAN) utilizes blockchain technology to store and share device information. We present the design of this new attestation architecture as well as a prototype system chosen to emulate an IoT deployment with a network of Raspberry Pi, Infineon TPMs, and a Hyperledger Fabric blockchain.
Bitcoin is gaining traction as an alternative store of value. Its market capitalization transcends all other cryptocurrencies in the market. But its high monetary value also makes it an attractive target to cyber criminal actors. Hacking campaigns usually target the weakest points in an ecosystem. In Bitcoin, these are currently the exchange platforms. As each exchange breach potentially decreases Bitcoin's market value by billions, it is a threat not only to direct victims, but to everyone owning Bitcoin. Based on an extensive analysis of 36 breaches of Bitcoin exchanges, we show the attack patterns used to exploit Bitcoin exchange platforms using an industry standard for reporting intelligence on cyber security breaches. Based on this we are able to provide an overview of the most common attack vectors, showing that all except three hacks were possible due to relatively lax security. We also show that while the security regimen of Bitcoin exchanges is not on par with other financial service providers, the use of stolen credentials, which does not require any hacking, is decreasing. We also show that the amount of BTC taken during a breach is decreasing, as well as the exchanges that terminate after being breached. With exchanges being targeted by nation-state hacking groups, security needs to be a first concern.
Computer networks and surging advancements of innovative information technology construct a critical infrastructure for network transactions of business entities. Information exchange and data access though such infrastructure is scrutinized by adversaries for vulnerabilities that lead to cyber-attacks. This paper presents an agent-based system modelling to conceptualize and extract explicit and latent structure of the complex enterprise systems as well as human interactions within the system to determine common vulnerabilities of the entity. The model captures emergent behavior resulting from interactions of multiple network agents including the number of workstations, regular, administrator and third-party users, external and internal attacks, defense mechanisms for the network setting, and many other parameters. A risk-based approach to modelling cybersecurity of a business entity is utilized to derive the rate of attacks. A neural network model will generalize the type of attack based on network traffic features allowing dynamic state changes. Rules of engagement to generate self-organizing behavior will be leveraged to appoint a defense mechanism suitable for the attack-state of the model. The effectiveness of the model will be depicted by time-state chart that shows the number of affected assets for the different types of attacks triggered by the entity risk and the time it takes to revert into normal state. The model will also associate a relevant cost per incident occurrence that derives the need for enhancement of security solutions.
In the last couple of years, the move to cyberspace provides a fertile environment for ransomware criminals like ever before. Notably, since the introduction of WannaCry, numerous ransomware detection solution has been proposed. However, the ransomware incidence report shows that most organizations impacted by ransomware are running state of the art ransomware detection tools. Hence, an alternative solution is an urgent requirement as the existing detection models are not sufficient to spot emerging ransomware treat. With this motivation, our work proposes "DeepGuard," a novel concept of modeling user behavior for ransomware detection. The main idea is to log the file-interaction pattern of typical user activity and pass it through deep generative autoencoder architecture to recreate the input. With sufficient training data, the model can learn how to reconstruct typical user activity (or input) with minimal reconstruction error. Hence, by applying the three-sigma limit rule on the model's output, DeepGuard can distinguish the ransomware activity from the user activity. The experiment result shows that DeepGuard effectively detects a variant class of ransomware with minimal false-positive rates. Overall, modeling the attack detection with user-behavior permits the proposed strategy to have deep visibility of various ransomware families.
This article describes attacks methods, vectors and technics used by threat actors during pandemic situations in the world. Identifies common targets of threat actors and cyber-attack tactics. The article analyzes cybersecurity challenges and specifies possible solutions and improvements in cybersecurity. Defines cybersecurity controls, which should be taken against analyzed attack vectors.