Biblio

Byzantine fault tolerance has been intensively studied over the past decade as a way to enhance the intrusion resilience of computer systems. However, state-machine-based Byzantine fault tolerance algorithms require deterministic application processing and sequential execution of totally ordered requests. One way of increasing the practicality of Byzantine fault tolerance is to exploit the application semantics, which we refer to as application-aware Byzantine fault tolerance. Application-aware Byzantine fault tolerance makes it possible to facilitate concurrent processing of requests, to minimize the use of Byzantine agreement, and to identify and control replica nondeterminism. In this paper, we provide an overview of recent works on application-aware Byzantine fault tolerance techniques. We elaborate the need for exploiting application semantics for Byzantine fault tolerance and the benefits of doing so, provide a classification of various approaches to application-aware Byzantine fault tolerance, and outline the mechanisms used in achieving application-aware Byzantine fault tolerance according to our classification.

Byzantine fault tolerance has been intensively studied over the past decade as a way to enhance the intrusion resilience of computer systems. However, state-machine-based Byzantine fault tolerance algorithms require deterministic application processing and sequential execution of totally ordered requests. One way of increasing the practicality of Byzantine fault tolerance is to exploit the application semantics, which we refer to as application-aware Byzantine fault tolerance. Application-aware Byzantine fault tolerance makes it possible to facilitate concurrent processing of requests, to minimize the use of Byzantine agreement, and to identify and control replica nondeterminism. In this paper, we provide an overview of recent works on application-aware Byzantine fault tolerance techniques. We elaborate the need for exploiting application semantics for Byzantine fault tolerance and the benefits of doing so, provide a classification of various approaches to application-aware Byzantine fault tolerance, and outline the mechanisms used in achieving application-aware Byzantine fault tolerance according to our classification.

In a modern software system, when a program fails, a crash report which contains an execution trace would be sent to the software vendor for diagnosis. A crash report which corresponds to a failure could be caused by multiple types of faults simultaneously. Many large companies such as Baidu organize a team to analyze these failures, and classify them into multiple labels (i.e., multiple types of faults). However, it would be time-consuming and difficult for developers to manually analyze these failures and come out with appropriate fault labels. In this paper, we automatically classify a failure into multiple types of faults, using a composite algorithm named MLL-GA, which combines various multi-label learning algorithms by leveraging genetic algorithm (GA). To evaluate the effectiveness of MLL-GA, we perform experiments on 6 open source programs and show that MLL-GA could achieve average F-measures of 0.6078 to 0.8665. We also compare our algorithm with Ml.KNN and show that on average across the 6 datasets, MLL-GA improves the average F-measure of MI.KNN by 14.43%.
 

Most web applications have critical bugs (faults) affecting their security, which makes them vulnerable to attacks by hackers and organized crime. To prevent these security problems from occurring it is of utmost importance to understand the typical software faults. This paper contributes to this body of knowledge by presenting a field study on two of the most widely spread and critical web application vulnerabilities: SQL Injection and XSS. It analyzes the source code of security patches of widely used web applications written in weak and strong typed languages. Results show that only a small subset of software fault types, affecting a restricted collection of statements, is related to security. To understand how these vulnerabilities are really exploited by hackers, this paper also presents an analysis of the source code of the scripts used to attack them. The outcomes of this study can be used to train software developers and code inspectors in the detection of such faults and are also the foundation for the research of realistic vulnerability and attack injectors that can be used to assess security mechanisms, such as intrusion detection systems, vulnerability scanners, and static code analyzers.

Modern cyber systems and their integration with the infrastructure has a clear effect on the productivity and quality of life immensely. Their involvement in our daily life elevate the need for means to insure their resilience against attacks and failure. One major threat is the software monoculture. Latest research work demonstrated the danger of software monoculture and presented diversity to reduce the attack surface. In this paper, we propose ChameleonSoft, a multidimensional software diversity employment to, in effect, induce spatiotemporal software behavior encryption and a moving target defense. ChameleonSoft introduces a loosely coupled, online programmable software-execution foundation separating logic, state and physical resources. The elastic construction of the foundation enabled ChameleonSoft to define running software as a set of behaviorally-mutated functionally-equivalent code variants. ChameleonSoft intelligently Shuffle, at runtime, these variants while changing their physical location inducing untraceable confusion and diffusion enough to encrypt the execution behavior of the running software. ChameleonSoft is also equipped with an autonomic failure recovery mechanism for enhanced resilience. In order to test the applicability of the proposed approach, we present a prototype of the ChameleonSoft Behavior Encryption (CBE) and recovery mechanisms. Further, using analysis and simulation, we study the performance and security aspects of the proposed system. This study aims to assess the provisioned level of security by measuring the avalanche effect percentage and the induced confusion and diffusion levels to evaluate the strength of the CBE mechanism. Further, we compute the computational cost of security provisioning and enhancing system resilience.

Modern cyber systems and their integration with the infrastructure has a clear effect on the productivity and quality of life immensely. Their involvement in our daily life elevate the need for means to insure their resilience against attacks and failure. One major threat is the software monoculture. Latest research work demonstrated the danger of software monoculture and presented diversity to reduce the attack surface. In this paper, we propose ChameleonSoft, a multidimensional software diversity employment to, in effect, induce spatiotemporal software behavior encryption and a moving target defense. ChameleonSoft introduces a loosely coupled, online programmable software-execution foundation separating logic, state and physical resources. The elastic construction of the foundation enabled ChameleonSoft to define running software as a set of behaviorally-mutated functionally-equivalent code variants. ChameleonSoft intelligently Shuffle, at runtime, these variants while changing their physical location inducing untraceable confusion and diffusion enough to encrypt the execution behavior of the running software. ChameleonSoft is also equipped with an autonomic failure recovery mechanism for enhanced resilience. In order to test the applicability of the proposed approach, we present a prototype of the ChameleonSoft Behavior Encryption (CBE) and recovery mechanisms. Further, using analysis and simulation, we study the performance and security aspects of the proposed system. This study aims to assess the provisioned level of security by measuring the avalanche effect percentage and the induced confusion and diffusion levels to evaluate the strength of the CBE mechanism. Further, we compute the computational cost of security provisioning and enhancing system resilience.

We propose a resilience architecture for improving the security and dependability of authentication and authorization infrastructures, in particular the ones based on RADIUS and OpenID. This architecture employs intrusion-tolerant replication, trusted components and entrusted gateways to provide survivable services ensuring compatibility with standard protocols. The architecture was instantiated in two prototypes, one implementing RADIUS and another implementing OpenID. These prototypes were evaluated in fault-free executions, under faults, under attack, and in diverse computing environments. The results show that, beyond being more secure and dependable, our prototypes are capable of achieving the performance requirements of enterprise environments, such as IT infrastructures with more than 400k users.
 

Cloud Computing is emerging as a new paradigm that aims delivering computing as a utility. For the cloud computing paradigm to be fully adopted and effectively used, it is critical that the security mechanisms are robust and resilient to faults and attacks. Securing cloud systems is extremely complex due to the many interdependent tasks such as application layer firewalls, alert monitoring and analysis, source code analysis, and user identity management. It is strongly believed that we cannot build cloud services that are immune to attacks. Resiliency to attacks is becoming an important approach to address cyber-attacks and mitigate their impacts. Resiliency for mission critical systems is demanded higher. In this paper, we present a methodology to develop an Autonomic Resilient Cloud Management (ARCM) based on moving target defense, cloud service Behavior Obfuscation (BO), and autonomic computing. By continuously and randomly changing the cloud execution environments and platform types, it will be difficult especially for insider attackers to figure out the current execution environment and their existing vulnerabilities, thus allowing the system to evade attacks. We show how to apply the ARCM to one class of applications, Map/Reduce, and evaluate its performance and overhead.
 

In this paper we propose a methodology and a prototype tool to evaluate web application security mechanisms. The methodology is based on the idea that injecting realistic vulnerabilities in a web application and attacking them automatically can be used to support the assessment of existing security mechanisms and tools in custom setup scenarios. To provide true to life results, the proposed vulnerability and attack injection methodology relies on the study of a large number of vulnerabilities in real web applications. In addition to the generic methodology, the paper describes the implementation of the Vulnerability & Attack Injector Tool (VAIT) that allows the automation of the entire process. We used this tool to run a set of experiments that demonstrate the feasibility and the effectiveness of the proposed methodology. The experiments include the evaluation of coverage and false positives of an intrusion detection system for SQL Injection attacks and the assessment of the effectiveness of two top commercial web application vulnerability scanners. Results show that the injection of vulnerabilities and attacks is indeed an effective way to evaluate security mechanisms and to point out not only their weaknesses but also ways for their improvement.