Biblio
Mobile security remains a concern for multiple stakeholders. Safe user behavior is crucial key to avoid and mitigate mobile threats. The research used a survey design to capture key constructs of mobile user threat avoidance behavior. Analysis revealed that there is no significant difference between the two key drivers of secure behavior, threat appraisal and coping appraisal, for Android and iOS users. However, statistically significant differences in avoidance motivation and avoidance behavior of users of the two operating systems were displayed. This indicates that existing threat avoidance models may be insufficient to comprehensively deal with factors that affect mobile user behavior. A newly introduced variable, perceived security, shows a difference in the perceptions of their level of protection among the users of the two operating systems, providing a new direction for research into mobile security.
With the emergence of quantum computers, traditional digital signature schemes based on problems such as large integer solutions and discrete logarithms will no longer be secure, and it is urgent to find effective digital signature schemes that can resist quantum attacks. Lattice cryptography has the advantages of computational simplicity and high security. In this paper, we propose an identity-based digital signature scheme based on the rejection sampling algorithm. Unlike most schemes that use a common Gaussian distribution, this paper uses a bimodal Gaussian distribution, which improves efficiency. The identity-based signature scheme is more convenient for practical application than the traditional certificate-based signature scheme.
Commodity hypervisors are widely deployed to support virtual machines (VMs) on multiprocessor hardware. Their growing complexity poses a security risk. To enable formal verification over such a large codebase, we introduce microverification, a new approach that decomposes a commodity hypervisor into a small core and a set of untrusted services so that we can prove security properties of the entire hypervisor by verifying the core alone. To verify the multiprocessor hypervisor core, we introduce security-preserving layers to modularize the proof without hiding information leakage so we can prove each layer of the implementation refines its specification, and the top layer specification is refined by all layers of the core implementation. To verify commodity hypervisor features that require dynamically changing information flow, we introduce data oracles to mask intentional information flow. We can then prove noninterference at the top layer specification and guarantee the resulting security properties hold for the entire hypervisor implementation. Using microverification, we retrofitted the Linux KVM hypervisor with only modest modifications to its codebase. Using Coq, we proved that the hypervisor protects the confidentiality and integrity of VM data, while retaining KVM’s functionality and performance. Our work is the first machine-checked security proof for a commodity multiprocessor hypervisor.
Modern enterprises increasingly take advantage of cloud infrastructures. Yet, outsourcing code and data into the cloud requires enterprises to trust cloud providers not to meddle with their data. To reduce the level of trust towards cloud providers, AMD has introduced Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV). By encrypting Virtual Machines (VMs), SEV aims to ensure data confidentiality, despite a compromised or curious Hypervisor. The SEV Encrypted State (SEV-ES) extension additionally protects the VM’s register state from unauthorized access. Yet, both extensions do not provide integrity of the VM’s memory, which has already been abused to leak the protected data or to alter the VM’s control-flow. In this paper, we introduce the SEVerity attack; a missing puzzle piece in the series of attacks against the AMD SEV family. Specifically, we abuse the system’s lack of memory integrity protection to inject and execute arbitrary code within SEV-ES-protected VMs. Contrary to previous code execution attacks against the AMD SEV family, SEVerity neither relies on a specific CPU version nor on any code gadgets inside the VM. Instead, SEVerity abuses the fact that SEV-ES prohibits direct memory access into the encrypted memory. Specifically, SEVerity injects arbitrary code into the encrypted VM through I/O channels and uses the Hypervisor to locate and trigger the execution of the encrypted payload. This allows us to sidestep the protection mechanisms of SEV-ES. Overall, our results demonstrate a success rate of 100% and hence highlight that memory integrity protection is an obligation when encrypting VMs. Consequently, our work presents the final stroke in a series of attacks against AMD SEV and SEV-ES and renders the present implementation as incapable of protecting against a curious, vulnerable, or malicious Hypervisor.