Software and Attack Centric Integrated Threat Modeling for Quantitative Risk Assessment
Title | Software and Attack Centric Integrated Threat Modeling for Quantitative Risk Assessment |
Publication Type | Conference Paper |
Year of Publication | 2016 |
Authors | Potteiger, Bradley, Martins, Goncalo, Koutsoukos, Xenofon |
Conference Name | Proceedings of the Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security |
Publisher | ACM |
Conference Location | New York, NY, USA |
ISBN Number | 978-1-4503-4277-3 |
Keywords | Attack Graphs, composability, Cyber-physical systems, Human Behavior, Metrics, pubcrawl, quantitative risk assessment, Resiliency, threat modeling, threat vectors |
Abstract | One step involved in the security engineering process is threat modeling. Threat modeling involves understanding the complexity of the system and identifying all of the possible threats, regardless of whether or not they can be exploited. Proper identification of threats and appropriate selection of countermeasures reduces the ability of attackers to misuse the system. This paper presents a quantitative, integrated threat modeling approach that merges software and attack centric threat modeling techniques. The threat model is composed of a system model representing the physical and network infrastructure layout, as well as a component model illustrating component specific threats. Component attack trees allow for modeling specific component contained attack vectors, while system attack graphs illustrate multi-component, multi-step attack vectors across the system. The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is leveraged to provide a standardized method of quantifying the low level vulnerabilities in the attack trees. As a case study, a railway communication network is used, and the respective results using a threat modeling software tool are presented. |
URL | http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2898375.2898390 |
DOI | 10.1145/2898375.2898390 |
Citation Key | potteiger_software_2016 |