Making Split-fabrication More Secure

Today many design houses must outsource their design fabrication to a third party which is often an overseas foundry. Split-fabrication is proposed for combining the FEOL capabilities of an advanced but untrusted foundry with the BEOL capabilities of a trusted foundry. Hardware security in this business model relates directly to the front-end foundry's ability to interpret the partial circuit design it receives in order to reverse engineer or insert malicious circuits. The published experimental results indicate that a relatively large percentage of the split nets can be correctly guessed and there is no easy way of detecting the possibly inserted Trojans. In this paper, we propose a secure split-fabrication design methodology for the Vertical Slit Field Effect Transistor (VeSFET) based integrated circuits. We take advantage of the VeSFET's unique and powerful two-side accessibility and monolithic 3D integration capability. In our approach the design is manufactured by two independent foundries, both of which can be untrusted. We propose the design partition and piracy prevention, hardware Trojan insertion prevention, and Trojan detection methods. In the 3D designs, some transistors are physically hidden from the front-end foundry\_1's view, which causes that it is impossible for this foundry to reconstruct the circuit. We designed 10 MCNC benchmark circuits using the proposed flow and executed an attack by an in-house developed proximity attacker. With 5% nets manufactured by the back-end foundry\_2, the average percentage of the correctly reconstructed partitioned nets is less than 1%.