Title | Market-based Security for Distributed Applications |
Publication Type | Conference Paper |
Year of Publication | 2017 |
Authors | Bissias, George, Levine, Brian N., Kapadia, Nikunj |
Conference Name | Proceedings of the 2017 New Security Paradigms Workshop |
Publisher | ACM |
Conference Location | New York, NY, USA |
ISBN Number | 978-1-4503-6384-6 |
Keywords | control theory, financial derivatives, game theory, Human Behavior, human factors, resilience, Resiliency, Scalability, security, smart contracts, software security |
Abstract | Ethereum contracts can be designed to function as fully decentralized applications called DAPPs that hold financial assets, and many have already been fielded. Unfortunately, DAPPs can be hacked, and the assets they control can be stolen. A recent attack on an Ethereum decentralized application called The DAO demonstrated that smart contract bugs are more than an academic concern. Ether worth hundreds of millions of US dollars was extracted by an attacker from The DAO, sending the value of its tokens and the overall exchange price of ether itself tumbling. We present two market-based techniques for insuring the ether holdings of a DAPP. These mechanisms exist and are managed as part of the core programming of the DAPP, rather than as separate mechanisms managed by users. Our first technique is based on futures contracts indexed by the trade price of ether for DAPP tokens. Under fairly general circumstances, our technique is capable of recovering the majority of ether lost from theft with high probability even when all of the ether holdings are stolen; and the only cost to DAPP token holders is an adjustable ether withdrawal fee. As a second, complementary, technique we propose the use of Gated Public Offerings (GPO) as a mechanism that mitigates the effects of attackers that exploit DAPP withdrawal vulnerabilities. We show that using more than one public offering round encourages attackers to exploit the vulnerability early, or depending on certain factors, to delay exploitation (possibly indefinitely) and short tokens in the market instead. In both cases, less ether is ultimately stolen from the DAPP, and in the later case, some of the losses are transferred to the market. |
URL | http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3171533.3171541 |
DOI | 10.1145/3171533.3171541 |
Citation Key | bissias_market-based_2017 |