Measuring Information Leakage in Website Fingerprinting Attacks and Defenses
| Title | Measuring Information Leakage in Website Fingerprinting Attacks and Defenses |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2018 |
| Authors | Li, Shuai, Guo, Huajun, Hopper, Nicholas |
| Conference Name | Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security |
| Publisher | ACM |
| Conference Location | New York, NY, USA |
| ISBN Number | 978-1-4503-5693-0 |
| Keywords | anonymity, composability, Human Behavior, human factors, Metrics, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, Tor, website fingerprinting |
| Abstract | Tor provides low-latency anonymous and uncensored network access against a local or network adversary. Due to the design choice to minimize traffic overhead (and increase the pool of potential users) Tor allows some information about the client's connections to leak. Attacks using (features extracted from) this information to infer the website a user visits are called Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks. We develop a methodology and tools to measure the amount of leaked information about a website. We apply this tool to a comprehensive set of features extracted from a large set of websites and WF defense mechanisms, allowing us to make more fine-grained observations about WF attacks and defenses. |
| URL | https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=3243734.3243832 |
| DOI | 10.1145/3243734.3243832 |
| Citation Key | liMeasuringInformationLeakage2018 |