Warning Time: Optimizing Strategic Signaling for Security Against Boundedly Rational Adversaries
| Title | Warning Time: Optimizing Strategic Signaling for Security Against Boundedly Rational Adversaries |
| Publication Type | Journal Article |
| Year of Publication | 2019 |
| Authors | Sarah Cooney, Phebe Vayanos, Thanh H. Nguyen, Cleotilde Gonzalez, Christian Lebiere, Edward A. Cranford, Milind Tambe |
| Journal | Team Core USC |
| Keywords | Articles of Interest, Bounded Rationality, C3E 2019, Cognitive Security, Cognitive Security in Cyber, human subject experiments, signaling scheme, Stackelberg Security Game, Strategic Signaling |
| Abstract | Defender-attacker Stackelberg security games (SSGs) have been applied for solving many real-world security problems. Recent work in SSGs has incorporated a deceptive signaling scheme into the SSG model, where the defender strategically reveals information about her defensive strategy to the attacker, in order to influence the attacker's decision making for the defender's own benefit. In this work, we study the problem of signaling in security games against a boundedly rational attacker. |
| URL | http://teamcore.usc.edu/papers/2019/sample-aamas19.pdf |
| Citation Key | node-62492 |