| Title | Killing EM Side-Channel Leakage at its Source |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2020 |
| Authors | Das, Debayan, Nath, Mayukh, Ghosh, Santosh, Sen, Shreyas |
| Conference Name | 2020 IEEE 63rd International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS) |
| Keywords | Attenuation, composability, cryptography, EM Side-channel attack, Local lower metal routing, Low-overhead countermeasure, Metals, Metrics, Probes, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, Routing, Signature Suppression, Switches, white box cryptography, White-box modeling |
| Abstract | Side-channel analysis (SCA) is a big threat to the security of connected embedded devices. Over the last few years, physical non-invasive SCA attacks utilizing the electromagnetic (EM) radiation (EM side-channel `leakage') from a crypto IC has gained huge momentum owing to the availability of the low-cost EM probes and development of the deep-learning (DL) based profiling attacks. In this paper, our goal is to understand the source of the EM leakage by analyzing a white-box modeling of the EM leakage from the crypto IC, leading towards a low-overhead generic countermeasure. To kill this EM leakage from its source, the solution utilizes a signature attenuation hardware (SAH) encapsulating the crypto core locally within the lower metal layers such that the critical correlated crypto current signature is significantly attenuated before it passes through the higher metal layers to connect to the external pin. The protection circuit utilizing AES256 as the crypto core is fabricated in 65nm process and shows for the first time the effects of metal routing on the EM leakage. The \textbackslashtextgreater 350x signature attenuation of the SAH together with the local lower metal routing ensured that the protected AES remains secure even after 1B measurements for both EM and power SCA, which is an 100x improvement over the state-of-the-art with comparable overheads. Overall, with the combination of the 2 techniques - signature suppression and local lower metal routing, we are able to kill the EM side-channel leakage at its source such that the correlated signature is not passed through the top-level metals, MIM capacitors, or on-board inductors, which are the primary sources of EM leakage, thereby preventing EM SCA attacks. |
| DOI | 10.1109/MWSCAS48704.2020.9184657 |
| Citation Key | das_killing_2020 |
Killing EM Side-Channel Leakage at its Source