Biblio

In recent years, there have been situations in which the zero-sequence protection of the transformer has been incorrectly operated due to the converter transformer energizing or fault recovery. For converter transformers, maloperation may also occur. However, there is almost no theoretical research on the zero-mode inrush currents of converter transformers. This paper studies the characteristics of the zero-mode inrush currents of the converter transformers, including the relationship between the amplitude and attenuation characteristics of the zero-mode inrush currents of converter transformers, and their relationship with the system resistance, remanence, and closing angle. First, based on the T-type equivalent circuit of the transformer, the equivalent circuit of the zero-mode inrush current of each transformer is obtained. On this basis, the amplitude relationship of the zero-mode inrush currents of different converter transformers is obtained: the zero-mode inrush current of the energizing pole YY transformer becomes larger than the YD transformer, the energized pole YD becomes greater than the YY transformer, and the YY transformer zero-mode inrush current rises from 0. It is also analyzed that the sympathetic interaction will make the attenuation of the converter transformer zero-mode inrush current slower. The system resistance mainly affects the initial attenuation speed, and the later attenuation speed is mainly determined by the converter transformer leakage reactance. Finally, PSCAD modeling and simulation are carried out to verify the accuracy of the theoretical analysis.

Due to the low power of electromagnetic radiation (EMR), EM convert channel has been widely considered as a short-range attack that can be easily mitigated by shielding. This paper overturns this common belief by demonstrating how covert EM signals leaked from typical laptops, desktops and servers are decoded from hundreds of meters away, or penetrate aggressive shield previously considered as sufficient to ensure emission security. We achieve this by designing EMLoRa – a super resilient EM covert channel that exploits memory as a LoRa-like radio. EMLoRa represents the first attempt of designing an EM covert channel using state-of-the-art spread spectrum technology. It tackles a set of unique challenges, such as handling complex spectral characteristics of EMR, tolerating signal distortions caused by CPU contention, and preventing adversarial detectors from demodulating covert signals. Experiment results show that EMLoRa boosts communication range by 20x and improves attenuation resilience by up to 53 dB when compared with prior EM covert channels at the same bit rate. By achieving this, EMLoRa allows an attacker to circumvent security perimeter, breach Faraday cage, and localize air-gapped devices in a wide area using just a small number of inexpensive sensors. To countermeasure EMLoRa, we further explore the feasibility of uncovering EMLoRa's signal using energy- and CNN-based detectors. Experiments show that both detectors suffer limited range, allowing EMLoRa to gain a significant range advantage. Our results call for further research on the countermeasure against spread spectrum-based EM covert channels.

Side-channel analysis (SCA) is a big threat to the security of connected embedded devices. Over the last few years, physical non-invasive SCA attacks utilizing the electromagnetic (EM) radiation (EM side-channel `leakage') from a crypto IC has gained huge momentum owing to the availability of the low-cost EM probes and development of the deep-learning (DL) based profiling attacks. In this paper, our goal is to understand the source of the EM leakage by analyzing a white-box modeling of the EM leakage from the crypto IC, leading towards a low-overhead generic countermeasure. To kill this EM leakage from its source, the solution utilizes a signature attenuation hardware (SAH) encapsulating the crypto core locally within the lower metal layers such that the critical correlated crypto current signature is significantly attenuated before it passes through the higher metal layers to connect to the external pin. The protection circuit utilizing AES256 as the crypto core is fabricated in 65nm process and shows for the first time the effects of metal routing on the EM leakage. The \textbackslashtextgreater 350× signature attenuation of the SAH together with the local lower metal routing ensured that the protected AES remains secure even after 1B measurements for both EM and power SCA, which is an 100× improvement over the state-of-the-art with comparable overheads. Overall, with the combination of the 2 techniques - signature suppression and local lower metal routing, we are able to kill the EM side-channel leakage at its source such that the correlated signature is not passed through the top-level metals, MIM capacitors, or on-board inductors, which are the primary sources of EM leakage, thereby preventing EM SCA attacks.

In this work, communication secrecy in cooperative and multi-hop wireless communications for various radio frequencies are examined. Attenuation lines and ranges of both detection and ultimate secrecy regions were calculated for cooperative communication channel and multi-hop channel with various number of hops. From results, frequency ranges with the highest potential to apply bandwidth saving method known as frequency reuse were determined and compared to point-to-point channel. Frequencies with the highest attenuation were derived and their ranges of both detection and ultimate secrecy are calculated. Point-to-point, cooperative and multi-hop channels were compared in terms of ultimate secrecy ranges. Multi-hop channel measurements were made with different number of hops and the relation between the number of hops and communication security is examined. Ultimate secrecy ranges were calculated up to 1 Terahertz and found to be less than 13 meters between 550-565 GHz frequency range. Therefore, for short-range wireless communication systems such as indoor and in-device communication systems (board-to-board or chip-to-chip communications), it is shown that various bands in the Terahertz band can be used to reuse the same frequency in different locations to obtain high security and high bandwidth.

In this work, communication secrecy in the physical layer for various radio frequencies is examined. Frequencies with the highest level of secrecy in 1-1000 GHz range and their level of communication secrecy are derived. The concept of ultimate secrecy in wireless communications is proposed. Attenuation lines and ranges of both detection and ultimate secrecy are calculated for transmitter powers from 1 W to 1000 W. From results, frequencies with the highest potential to apply bandwidth saving method known as frequency reuse are devised. Commonly used secrecy benchmarks for the given conditions are calculated. Frequencies with the highest attenuation are devised and their ranges of both detection and ultimate secrecy are calculated.

Quantum information exchange computer emulator is presented, which takes into consideration imperfections of real quantum channel such as noise and attenuation resulting in the necessity to increase number of photons in the impulse. The Qt Creator C++ program package provides evaluation of the ability to detect unauthorized access as well as an amount of information intercepted by intruder.

The engine is a significant and dynamic component of the aircraft. Because of the complicated structure and severe operating environment, the fault detection of the engine has always been the key and difficult issue in the field of reliability. Based on an engine and the acoustic emission technology, we propose a method of identifying fault types and determining different components in the engine by constructing the attenuation coefficient. There are several common faults of engines, and three different types of fault sources are generated experimentally in this work. Then the fault signal of the above fault sources propagating in different engine components are obtained. Finally, the acoustic emission characteristics of the fault signal are extracted and judged by the attenuation coefficient. The work effectively identifies different types of faults and studies the effects of different structural components on the propagation of fault acoustic emission signals, which provides a method for the use of acoustic emission technology to identify the faults types of the engine and to study the propagation characteristics of AE signals on the engine.*