| Title | High-Assurance Cryptography in the Spectre Era |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2021 |
| Authors | Barthe, Gilles, Cauligi, Sunjay, Grégoire, Benjamin, Koutsos, Adrien, Liao, Kevin, Oliveira, Tiago, Priya, Swarn, Rezk, Tamara, Schwabe, Peter |
| Conference Name | 2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) |
| Date Published | may |
| Keywords | compositionality, Libraries, Memory management, Predictive Metrics, privacy, Program processors, provable security, pubcrawl, Resiliency, Robustness, Semantics, Software |
| Abstract | High-assurance cryptography leverages methods from program verification and cryptography engineering to deliver efficient cryptographic software with machine-checked proofs of memory safety, functional correctness, provable security, and absence of timing leaks. Traditionally, these guarantees are established under a sequential execution semantics. However, this semantics is not aligned with the behavior of modern processors that make use of speculative execution to improve performance. This mismatch, combined with the high-profile Spectre-style attacks that exploit speculative execution, naturally casts doubts on the robustness of high-assurance cryptography guarantees. In this paper, we dispel these doubts by showing that the benefits of high-assurance cryptography extend to speculative execution, costing only a modest performance overhead. We build atop the Jasmin verification framework an end-to-end approach for proving properties of cryptographic software under speculative execution, and validate our approach experimentally with efficient, functionally correct assembly implementations of ChaCha20 and Poly1305, which are secure against both traditional timing and speculative execution attacks. |
| DOI | 10.1109/SP40001.2021.00046 |
| Citation Key | barthe_high-assurance_2021 |
High-Assurance Cryptography in the Spectre Era